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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A COMPARISON OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
AS AGENTS OF NORM DIFFUSION:  
DARFUR CRISIS IN SUDAN  
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International organizations contribute to the diffusion of international norms. 
Although the impact of domestic conductivity on norm compliance is evident, the 
level of enforcement mechanism of these organizations does matter as well. Human 
rights norms as the most influential idea of the recent decades gained prominence in 
foreign policies of the states as well as in international law with the creation of 
international organizations. The United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) 
are today the most influential players in human rights promotion. Nevertheless, their 
impacts on the delinquent states differ significantly. From a rationalist perspective, 
this thesis will argue that despite the fact that the UN has been the legal guardian of 
human rights norms, the EU is a better promoter largely due to its political 
conditionalities on the future member states and it is more successful at sustaining 
domestic change regarding human rights due to the attractiveness of its reward: full 
membership. This thesis, therefore, focuses on the role of these organizations in 
promoting human rights and facilitating norm diffusion specifically by looking at the 
UN‟s role in Sudan regarding Darfur crisis, and the EU‟s impact on Turkey regarding 
freedom of expression.  
.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
BİRLEŞMİŞ MİLLETLER VE AVRUPA BİRLİĞİNİN NORM YAYICI 
AKTÖRLER OLARAK KARŞILAŞTIRILMASI:  
DARFUR KRİZİ VE TÜRKİYE’DE İFADE ÖZGÜRLÜĞÜ 
 
ASLI BAYSAL 
Siyaset Bilimi Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tez, 2009 
 
Danışman: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İnsan hakları, Darfur krizi, 301. Madde, siyasi önkoşullar,   
yaşama hakkı, ifade özgürlüğü hakkı 
Uluslararası Organizasyonlar uluslararası normların benimsenmesine katkıda bulunur. 
Bu normlara uymak icin elverişli ortam saglayan ic dinamikler onemliyse de 
uluslararası organizasyonların kullandıkları zorlama mekanizmaları ve bunların 
seviyeleri göz ardı edilemez etkenlerdir.  İnsan hakları normları bu organizasyonların 
kurulmasıyla birlikte hem ülkelerin dış politikalarında hem uluslarararası hukukta son 
yıllarda giderek daha fazla önem kazanmaktadır. Bugün, Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) ve 
Avrupa Birliği (AB) devletlerin insan hakları normlarına uyumunun 
yaygınlaştırılmasında en etkili uluslararası aktorlerdir. Bu iki organizasyonun bu 
normlara uymayan ülkeler üzerindeki etkileri ise birbirinden farklıdır. Bu tez, BM insan 
hakları normlarının yasal koruyucusu olsa da, AB‟nin normları yaymakta daha başarılı 
bir aktör olabildigini tartışacaktır. BM‟de bulunmayan, AB‟de bulunan “üyelik” ödülü 
karşılıgında, aday ülkelerin AB üyelik sürecinin gerektirdiği siyasi koşulları tamamlama 
zorunluluğu, bu ülkelerin insan haklarına uyumunda önemli bir motivasyondur. Bu 
nedenledir ki bu tez, BM‟nin Sudan/Darfur krizindeki rolünü ve AB‟nin Türkiye‟de 
ifade özgürlüğünün gelişimindeki etkisini inceleyecektir. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Abstract……………………........................................................................................vi 
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………...1 
Chapter I: The Theoretical Framework...………………………………… ……….8 
I.   Norms: Conceptual Overview …………………………………………….9 
II.      Rationalist and Constructivist Assumptions on Norm Conformity and 
Violation…………………………………………………………………...10 
 
III.      Human Rights Norms……………………………………………………...14 
a) Norms and International Organizations………………………...………….16 
b) Universal and Regional Human Rights Promotion: Comparison of the 
United Nations and the European Union as agents of norm diffusion…….18 
 
c) The Promotion of Human Rights Norms: United Nations as a Global Human 
Rights Promoter …………………………………………………………...21 
 
d) Regional Human Rights: The European Union and Human Rights……….25 
e) Political Conditionality: The uniqueness of the EU as a Human Rights 
Promoter…………………………………………...………………………31 
 
f) The issue of Sovereignty in Human Rights Context………………………33 
g) The Right to Life, “Sovereignty as Responsibility” and Humanitarian 
Intervention as Human Rights Norms……………………………………..35 
 
h) Freedom of Expression as a Human Rights Norm………...………………41 
 
 
 
ix 
 
 
 
Chapter II: United Nations and Darfur Case: Humanitarian Intervention and 
Massive Violation of Basic Physical Security Rights……………………………...45 
I. The Historical Background: The Genesis, the Peak Point and the 
Magnitude of Sudan/Darfur conflict……………………………………..48 
 
II.      The Situation in Darfur and International Responses: 
             International Awareness, International Initiatives and Actors‟ Responses: 
 
a) The Role of the United Nations……………………………….…………50 
b) The Position of the United States………………………………..….……52 
c) The Position of the European Union……………………………………..55 
 
Chapter III: The European Union and Turkish Case: Freedom of Expression and 
Turkey………………………………………………………………………………..60 
I. Historical Legacies Leading to Human Rights Violations………………….64 
II. Historical and Empirical Analysis of Turkey‟s Human Rights Record … 69 
III. Freedom of Expression and the Debate over Article 301 in Turkey………..71 
 
Conclusion……………………………………………...…………………………....80 
Bibliography...…………………………………….....………………………………83 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A growing literature on international norms in international relations theory 
identifies the term norm more as “collective expectations for the proper behavior of 
actors within a given identity”1, than as regularities of behavior among actors. Thus, 
regularity of a behavior, which “gives rise to normative expectations as to what ought 
to be done”, is combined with an “internal attitude involving criticism of oneself or 
others” on the ground that the appropriate behavior is not followed.2 Nevertheless, 
increasingly norm-based rhetoric of international authorities today proves us that norm 
compliance is not automatic and “cannot be reduced to following a static set of clear 
sharp-edged rules”3. As the sources of norm diffusion are intricate, the explanations to 
the occasional variations of states‟ attitudes towards norms and the extent to which 
norms do have an impact on domestic politics are both extensive and controversial in 
the existing literature.  
The countries, which have a close fit between the clauses of international 
arrangements and agreements and the already established domestic policy norms, are 
more likely to be successful in promoting necessary policy changes domestically. Yet, 
for a clear discussion about the international factors of norm diffusion, there must be 
some degree of incompatibility between international level and domestic level 
processes. If this is the case, the degree of „fit‟ or „misfit‟ brings adaptational 
                                                          
1
 Katzenstein‟s definition; Shannon, Vaughn P;  “Norms are What States Make of 
them: The Political Psychology of Norm Violation”, International Studies Quarterly, 
Vol.44, No.2, June 2000, p.296 
2 Hurrel, Andrew, “Norms and Ethics in International Relations” in “Handbook of 
International Relations” edited by Carlsnaes, Walter; Risse, Thomas and Simmons, 
Beth A., Sage Publications, 2002, Chapter 7, p.143 
3
 Ibid. 
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pressures from the outside.
4
 The success of these pressures is pertaining typically to 
the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms of international organizations on the 
norm violator states. Hence, this thesis focuses on the level of impact of international 
organizations as significant agents of norm diffusion. 
International organizations enable the diffusion of international norms. Although 
the impact of domestic conductivity on norm compliance is evident, the level of 
enforcement mechanism of these organizations does matter as well. Human rights 
norms as the most influential idea of the recent decades gained prominence in foreign 
policies of the states as well as in international law with the creation of international 
organizations. The United Nations and the European Union are today the most 
influential players in human rights promotion. Nevertheless, their impacts on the 
delinquent states differ significantly. From a rationalist perspective, this thesis will 
argue that despite the fact that the United Nations has been the legal guardian of 
human rights norms, the European Union is a better promoter largely due to its 
political conditionalities on the future member states and it is more successful at 
sustaining domestic change regarding human rights due to the attractiveness of its 
reward: full membership. This thesis, therefore, focuses on the role of the UN and the 
EU in promoting human rights and facilitating norm diffusion. 
Two case studies will be presented in this thesis to support this statement. First 
case study will be conducted to illustrate the persistent breach of the right to life of 
Darfuris in Sudan from 2003 onwards and the lack of ability of the UN to deter the 
violations and enforce human rights standards to region. The second case study will 
endeavor to understand the exceptionality of the EU norm diffusion process compared 
to that of the UN due to its membership incentive and investigate the impact of the EU 
on Turkey through an analysis of improvement of the right to freedom of expression 
with a reference to the amendment of the Article 301 in 2008 in Turkey.  
                                                          
4
 Cowles, Maria Green; Caporaso, James; Risse, Thommas; “Europeanization and 
Domestic Change” in “Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change” 
edited by Cowles, Maria Green; Caporaso, James; Risse, Thommas; Cornell 
University Press, 2001, p.2 
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The theoretical framework of this thesis will be presented in Chapter I. The first 
part of this chapter will present a conceptual discussion about international norms 
which will follow the rationalist and constructivist debate with respect to diffusion of 
international norms in International Relations Theory. Since the essence of the debate 
between rationalists –mainly realists and neoliberals- and constructivists over the 
impact of norms comes from their different perceptions of norm compliance; two 
different logics will be used to understand the conditions under which states comply 
with norms; i.e. compliance either out of “logic of expected consequences” or “logic 
of appropriateness”. Since full membership incentive will be presented as a driving 
force for fulfilling political conditionalities with regards to human rights, the core 
vantage point of this thesis will be that the states as rational actors apply cost-benefit 
calculations to meet their own interests in an anarchical international system. Thus, 
this thesis will argue that “to comply with a norm is a simple matter of whether 
compliance meets an actor‟s defined interests” as the Turkish case in the forthcoming 
chapter will prove and the absence of these interests along with the low enforcement 
mechanisms of international organizations lacking both reward and punishment for the 
delinquent state will hinder norm diffusion because it will not affect the cost-benefit 
analysis of the violator state as the Sudan/Darfur crisis will illustrate. Nevertheless, 
constructivist logic will also help us to comprehend the importance of international 
organizations in international system and the concerns for the creation of a European 
identity guarding human rights at global politics.  
The second part of theoretical chapter will dwell upon the definition of human 
rights in general and within that framework where such rights as right to life and 
freedom of expression rest. In doing so, the main aim will be to demonstrate the role 
of international organizations in the creation and promotion of these norms. Later, the 
chapter will focus on the evolution of human rights norms both at global and regional 
level and briefly mention why regional organizations and specifically the EU has an 
advantage in norm promotion compared to the UN. The center of attention will be 
their instruments for norm enforcement. 
The United Nations is an important international organization to analyze the 
diffusion of norms on human rights as it is the main forum where such norms and 
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rights are discussed in a universal forum. What is important to note is that the UN 
neither presents strong monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to the system nor 
persuades its members to take an action against or irrelevant to their interests. This is a 
main difference from such international organizations as the Council of Europe (CE) 
or the European Union. The lack of enforcement capability for the UN undermines its 
credibility as an international actor. However, one should be careful in this assessment 
as the UN still acts as a forum for legitimacy which is defined by Ian Hurd as “the 
normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed.”5 Moreover, 
“a norm have a high degree of political legitimacy especially when it is 
institutionalized in the global international society”6 such as the UN-led human rights 
norms. 
On the other hand, the membership incentive for the EU and the carrots and 
sticks that the EU as well as the Council of Europe carry enable them to become more 
effective in stimulating the diffusion of norms to less developed countries.  Although 
arbitrary unwillingness has been the case for the EU as well regarding several issues, 
the concern for human rights especially in prospective member states has been 
tremendously important. From a rationalist logic, the EU has an interest in fellows 
who respect to democracy and human rights because of the need for predictable and 
harmonized policies at national level.  Moreover, the promotion of these norms is seen 
as part of the European identity and to their role in global politics. These norms have 
become the sine quo non benchmark for the new comers and also gave a kind of 
authority and prestige to the European Union as a guardian of human rights.  The EU 
did not lack the tools to monitor and enforce human rights within itself and for the 
prospective members such as European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) created 
under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) of the CE which injects 
hard law into the system and a kind of supranational jurisdiction over the member 
states with regards to human rights matters and most importantly becomes an implicit 
                                                          
5 Hurd, Ian; “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics”, International 
Organization, Vol.53, No.2, Spring 1999, p. 381 
6
Miyaoka, Isao; Working Paper on “State Compliance With International Legitimate 
Norms: Wildlife Preservationist Pressures On Japanese Fishing”; International Studies 
Association, 41st Annual Convention, Los Angeles, CA, March 14-18, 2000, p.8 
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criteria for the EU accession; European Court of Justice (ECJ) as the judicial organ of 
the EU which transformed itself in the recent years from being a court focusing 
primarily on economic relations of individuals, corporations and the states to a court 
considering the well-functioning of  human rights regime within the member states, 
thus urged the prospective members to adjust to this newly emerging judicial 
structure. In addition, Copenhagen Criteria was adopted in 1993 to evaluate 
applicants. It is used on the prospective members as a yardstick urging for democracy 
and respect for human rights. Consequently, membership incentive stands as a 
distinctive feature for the success of the EU. 
Nevertheless, as the EU lacked these instruments beyond its region and the EU 
within the UN is not such a strong advocate of human rights beyond borders; we can 
argue that the success of the EU in its region is because the EU member states have an 
interest in a predictable neighboring country which respects human rights and 
democracy similar to the prospective member state which has an interest in being a 
full member with material rewards. This dual sided motivation for norm compliance 
eases this process. Since the UN cannot provide such global effective instruments, the 
shortcomings of a universal human rights system are not likely to vanish easily. This 
is why, to support all these arguments, our case studies will be useful. 
Chapter II will analyze a fundamental human rights norm; the right to life, along 
with an emerging norm obliging „Responsibility to Protect‟ and humanitarian 
intervention by looking at the historical background and the current situation of the 
Darfur crisis in order to see the lack of autonomy of the United Nations as an 
international organization and to understand the lack of deterring impact on Sudanese 
government.  
Later, Chapter III will present the improvement of the right to freedom of 
expression in Turkey as a story of domestic change driven by EU membership 
prospect. Here, the main focus will be given to Article 301 which includes punishment 
for non-violent expression on the basis of denigration of Turkishness. Cases opened 
based on this Article violated the rights of many individuals and intellectuals with 
arbitrary interpretations of ambiguous clause. Despite the fact that this Article and its 
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previous version Article 159 have been numerously disapproved by the international 
community for years, the changes did not occur till 2008 when the non-compliance 
has become more costly in the eyes of Turkish political elites. This thesis argues that 
these changes in Article 301 results from the effective enforcement of political 
conditionalities of the EU during the negotiation process which started in October, 
2005.  
In short, the UN and the EU are not primarily human rights organizations and 
they differ in significant ways including their membership clauses, areas of focus, 
functions, motives and processes. By the same token, violation of freedom of 
expression in Turkey is not that grand in scale and not that much in need of urgent 
response by the international community. On the other hand, the massive violation of 
basic physical security norms in Darfur given the primacy of the right to life among 
all other human rights norms, generally requires a kind of military force for 
humanitarian purposes. Thus, neither two international organizations nor two cases in 
this thesis are perfectly analogous in all aspects. Nevertheless, this thesis will 
specifically depict the enforcement mechanisms of norm diffusion of these two 
organizations and the reaction of the delinquent states to these pressures; which will in 
turn allow comparison. However, this thesis will not include all mechanisms which 
can be used for human rights compliance by these international organizations. 
Although the focus will be a specific mechanism, political conditionality, the center of 
attention will not be the substance of this mechanism, but will be the difference 
caused by its presence and absence affecting the success of an organization in a 
particular issue. Even so, “effective” use of political conditionality, not political 
conditionality alone, will be tied to the roots of success of the EU in Turkish case.  
Therefore, this thesis acknowledges that there may be other cases, beyond the 
scope of this thesis, where the EU occasionally failed to show its deterring impact on 
human rights violations such as not only mass murders in distant places but also other 
various human rights issue areas where political conditionality has been applied 
ineffectively.  By presenting the UN with its failures in Darfur case and calling the EU 
as a successful norm promoter in Turkish case, this thesis, does not aim to achieve a 
general theory that applies to every specific case in which the UN or the EU acts 
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agents of norm diffusion. Yet, the insights from these case studies will attempt to 
bring some useful explanations to the levels of impact of these organizations. 
Given the insoluble situation in Darfur in spite of its vitality and the 
improvement of freedom of expression and the increasing debate in Turkey, the 
discrepancy between the deterring impact of these organizations on violations 
deserves attention in a world where the adherence to international norms started to be 
perceived inextricable to international cooperation, thereby world peace and global 
order. 
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  CHAPTER I 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
The role of international organizations on diffusion of international norms raised 
a plethora of questions which have been answered in diverse ways in International 
Relations theory.  Before examining their role in real world issues, theoretical chapter 
will allow us to have a point of reference to understand the complexity of the issue at 
hand. The first part of this chapter will thus elaborate on the theoretical framework of 
“norms” in the international politics literature. To do so, it will conceptualize norms, 
and their prescriptive and parametrical components. Later, different perspectives on 
norm diffusion from both rationalist and constructivist camps will be explored in order 
to weigh their explanatory strength on the case studies. These perspectives on norms 
and the institutions will highlight the context in which human rights norms operates.  
 
The second part of this chapter then scrutinizes human rights norms in general 
and in its institutional settings. Here, the focus will be on the instruments of norm 
diffusion that United Nations and the European Union carry as human rights 
promoters. The political conditionality as one of these instruments will be presented as 
the architect of the European exceptionality. Since the most important obstacle on the 
way to norm diffusion is identified as vanishing, but still persistent concept of 
absolute sovereignty of states, we will briefly mention its transformation to that of 
„sovereignty as responsibility‟. Lastly, the right to life and the right to freedom of 
expression will be explored in order to see why their violation as well as their 
diffusion matter in international system.  
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I. Norms: Conceptual Overview 
 
 
There is no denial of the existence of norms in the literature of International 
Relations theories though there are different conceptualizations. According to Gelpi, 
there is a distinction between descriptive and prescriptive norms. While the former 
refers to “a behavioral regularity, the way an actor usually behaves” constituting a 
pattern of behavior over a considerable time period; the latter defines the way in 
which an actor ought to behave.
7
 The latter does not necessarily refer to a rate of 
recurrence in the actor‟s behavior.  
 
One can analyze norms through their components: prescription and parameters. 
While the prescription part tells the actors „what to do‟ or „what not to do‟; the 
parameters indicate the possible conditions of the application of such prescriptions. 
For instance, “thou shalt not kill except in self-defense” becomes a prescription with a 
parameter in which the parameter acts with a legitimizing capacity and the actions 
other than such specified conditions by these parameters are seen as violation of the 
norm. After such standard-setting, the steady endorsement of norms brings about a 
label given by the followers of the norm to the outsiders as the “other”. Any deviation 
from what is seen as normal is “the constitutive of any project of improvement” 8, 
thus, it is difficult to define a norm without its „abnormal side‟ and without „othering‟ 
because what matters for the international system is the states violating the norms 
rather the ones which follow them. In other words, the violators and their persuasion 
for compliance constitute the basic motive for the initiatives for the human rights 
promotion.  After finding out the meaning of norm and norm violation, it is now 
useful to approach them from different theories of IR.   
 
                                                          
7 Christopher Gelpi quoted in  Miyaoka, Isao; Working Paper on “State Compliance 
With International Legitimate Norms: Wildlife Preservationist Pressures On Japanese 
Fishing”, 2000, p.5 
8
 Makarychev, Andrey S., “Rebranding Russia: Norms, Politics, and Power” in Tocci, 
Nathalie; Hamilton Daniel S.; Kumar, Radha; “Who is a Normative Foreign Policy  
Actor”, Center for European Policy Studies, 2008, p.157 
10 
 
 
II. Rationalist and Constructivist Assumptions on Norm 
Conformity and Violation 
 
There is more or less a general agreement over the definition of norms in 
international relations theory. In Katzenstein‟s words, norms are “collective 
expectations for the proper behavior of actors within a given identity”.9 However, 
there is a disagreement over the impact of norms on international behavior. The 
explanations to the sporadic attitudes of states towards norms in the existing literature 
are immense and contentious.  
The spring of the debate between rationalists –mainly realists and neoliberals- 
and constructivists over the impact of norms comes from their different perceptions of 
norm compliance as a result of either “logic of expected consequences” or “logic of 
appropriateness”: a distinction proposed by March and Olsen.10 Whilst 
consequentialists  argue that states comply with a norm “because and when it is useful 
to do”, the ones giving primacy to appropriateness support the view that compliance 
derives from the states‟ perception of righteousness and legitimacy of norms.11   
This distinction also associates with Copeland‟s summary of three ways of norm 
diffusion coinciding with three theoretical approaches in IR theory. The first 
explanation of norm diffusion, which is consistent with neorealism, is coercion in 
which the violator complies due to the threat of punishment by the other actors who 
are relatively superior to himself. The second approach comes to the forefront to 
neoliberal view, argues that the actors conform to the normative principles not 
because they see them as legitimate, but because it serves their self-interest. These two 
                                                          
9 Katzenstein quoted in Shannon, Vaughn P;  “Norms are What States Make of them: 
The Political Psychology of Norm Violation”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.44, 
No.2, June 2000, p. 294 
10 Ibid, p. 296 
11 James Fearon, Alexander Wendt, “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical 
View”, in “Handbook of International Relations” edited by Carlsnaes, Walter; Risse, 
Thomas and Simmons, Beth A., Sage Publications, 2002 Chapter 3, p.61 
11 
 
rationalist approaches present the logic of expected consequences as a result of cost-
benefit calculation of the state and they are purely instrumental explanations to norm 
diffusion. The third way incorporates with sociological approach, and argues that the 
states internalize norms because they see them as legitimate and as part of their 
identity. Let us acknowledge further differences between rationalist and constructivist 
approaches concerning the motivation behind norm compliance/violation. Only after 
mentioning these motivations, it would be possible to approach our case studies from 
a consequential view of the rationalist approach in the forthcoming chapters. 
First, rationalist approach accounts for a utilitarian perspective where the 
rational actors apply cost-benefit calculations to meet their own goals in an anarchical 
international system. Realism -classical realism and neorealism- assumes that norms 
themselves have no power to affect state behavior. For neorealists such as Kenneth 
Waltz and Robert Gilpin, who emphasize the structure of the international system as a 
system of anarchy, it is the distribution of power, namely distribution of military, 
economic, and technological capabilities among states, that has an effect on state 
behavior. Norms can exist only to the extent that they are related to the material 
capabilities of dominant states rather than to normative motivations. Similarly, Gilpin 
argues that the creation of norms is in the hands of dominant groups/states in the 
system and such actors “assert their rights and impose rules on lesser members in 
order to advance their particular interests.” 12 Thus, such a materialist explanation 
provides a norm definition as state instruments of serving their purposes. Likewise, 
E.H. Carr claims that universal principles are not principles at all, but “unconscious 
reflections of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national interest at 
a particular time”13  
Furthermore, realists view international organizations, which are the main 
promoters of human rights, epiphenomenal and less significant than they are perceived 
                                                          
12
 Miyaoka, Isao; Working Paper on “State Compliance With International Legitimate 
Norms: Wildlife Preservationist Pressures On Japanese Fishing”, 2000 p.1 
13
 E.H Carr,  Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939 (London-Macmillan, 1946, p.87 ) 
quoted  in Wheeler, Nicholas J.; “The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty” 
in “Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations” edited by Jennifer M. 
Welsh, Oxford University Press, 2004, p.31 
12 
 
by the most scholars because the standards they brought to the system are ineffective 
and stand just as “agreements to disagree”.14 Since the international organizations, for 
realists, cannot have a life autonomous from its members, the absence of self-interest 
of the states constituting the international organizations makes enforcement 
impossible. Similarly, the lack of self-interest of the violator state to comply with a 
norm cannot be deterred by weak enforcement instruments because the international 
organizations cannot change the calculations of the violator state without the 
willingness of its members. In other words, the violator does not perceive a threat or 
coercive action which increases the costs of violation. As a result, norm diffusion 
becomes unable to be realized when both the enforcer and the violator are short of 
benefits from norm compliance.  
Another theory in the rationalist camp, neoliberalism also takes its departure 
from similar assumptions of realism; selfish and rational actors in an anarchical 
system. Nonetheless, they argue that the role of international institutions including 
norms have a power in shaping/constraining state behavior. Since their focus is on 
norm compliance of a regime that offers the states long-term economic incentives, 
they do not directly address global normative issues such as human rights. 
Neoliberalism still matters for our subject matter with its “logic of consequences” 
arguing “to comply with a norm is a simple matter of whether compliance meets an 
actor‟s defined interests”.15 In accordance with this assumption, then, the violation of 
a norm is expected whenever norms conflict with states‟ self interests.  
Second, sociological approach of the constructivists typically treats “interest” as 
it is constituted by normative ideas rather than material interests. Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that constructivists downplay material interests, quite the contrary, they 
claim that “material factors matter at the limit, but how they matter depends on 
                                                          
14
 Alwarez, Jose; “International Institutions as Law Makers” (2005), “International 
Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals” edited by Steiner, Henry J.; Alston, 
Philip; Goodman, Ryan; Oxford University Press, Third Edition, 2008, p. 683. 
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ideas.”16 From the vantage point of constructivist logic, because norms shape interests, 
they cannot be opposed to interests.
17
 Such an ideational process both constraints 
states and construct their identities through learning appropriate behavior from other 
states, international organizations and NGOs. Constructivist view on international 
organizations is contradictory to that of realists. Keohane depicts that, for 
constructivists, “the institutions do not merely reflect the preferences and power of the 
units constituting them; the institutions themselves shape those preferences and that 
power”18 Thus, in Alexander Wendt's terms, “constructivism is a more ideational (or 
„less materialist‟) and more holist (or „less individualist‟) approach than neorealism 
and neoliberalism.”19 Moreover, constructivism offers state perception as a role-player 
rather than a utility maximizer. As March and Olsen point out, for constructivists, the 
appropriateness of the action of a state is more important than the consequences of its 
action. To put it differently, states comply with a norm from “a sense of obligation 
rather than a cost-benefit calculation.”20  
Nevertheless, as the case studies in the forthcoming chapters will support an 
opposing position to constructivism, this thesis favors the assumption that “if it is in 
one‟s best self-interest to follow a norm, then the appropriateness of “the norm has no 
independent impact on behavior.”21 
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For the subject matter of this thesis, rationalist approach is useful not only for 
understanding the willingness of the EU as an enforcer of human rights norms in 
Turkish case and unwillingness of the UN to act in Darfur case, but also for 
comprehending the reasons behind Turkey‟s decision to comply with normative 
principles and Sudan‟s insistence on breaches of human rights norms. Therefore, the 
reciprocal relation of norm promoters with the state which reacts to the expected 
adoption of the norm is crucial to understand the two sides of the norm diffusion. 
Thus, the theoretical assumption of this thesis will be the following: Norm diffusion is 
possible only when the benefits of enforcement exceed its costs for the enforcers, i.e 
the international organizations and the states constituting them, and only to the extent 
the costs of violation exceed the benefits of violation or the benefits of compliance 
surpass the costs for the delinquent state. In other words, this thesis looks at the 
change in cost-benefit analysis of violators resulting from the international pressure 
upon them and points out the direction that norm compliance and diffusion come from 
rational calculation by the players. 
 
 
III. International Human Rights Norms 
 
This thesis investigates the diffusion of norms with respect to human rights 
through the international organizations such as the UN and the EU.  This objective, in 
turn, requires the definition of human rights and specifically what aspect of human 
rights is being investigated in this thesis. This chapter attempts to provide a basic 
understanding of human rights in general and within that framework where such rights 
as right to life and freedom of expression rest. In doing so, the connection between 
norms and international institutions along with the distinctive features of universal and 
regional norm promoting institutions will be presented to provide a background to the 
normative pressures of the institutions on the sovereign states which will be illustrated 
by using the examples from Sudan and Turkey in the next chapters. 
15 
 
Human rights can be defined as “a set of principled ideas about the treatment to 
which all individuals are entitled by virtue of being human.”22 Although the roots of 
these social categories regulating relations between „individual right holders and 
states‟ predate to the struggles for religious freedom, the works of Kant, Locke, 
Rousseau, and Mill, the American and the French Revolution, the creation of US Bill 
of Rights and the French Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen,
23
 the 
abolition of slave trade; these rights were under domestic jurisdiction and were not an 
integral part of international relations and foreign policy and the individuals were not 
subjects of international law till the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.
24
 
Since then, human rights norms have been “the most magnetic political idea of 
contemporary time.”25 
If one thinks that all states in the world were committed to the shared conception 
of human rights, there would not be a need for human rights norms and institutions.
26
 
In other words, there are certain degrees of incompatibilities between international and 
domestic level processes regarding human rights norms so that there is a concern for 
human rights in international politics. As we have argued that norm compliance is not 
self-enforcing process, we will dwell upon the impact of international and regional 
organizations on domestic human rights policies such as the UN, and the EU 
associating with the Council of Europe. Before doing so, it is important to mention the 
connection between norms and institutions and to draw distinctive features of among 
those institutions.  
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a) Norms and International Organizations 
 
The desirability of cooperation between states increases with the emerging need 
for collective „proper‟ behavior to handle issues and problems at stake that require 
international solutions. All norm promoters at the international level need a certain 
level of institutionalization and an organizational platform through which they 
promote their norms.
27
 Therefore, norms and institutions are intrinsically linked to 
each other in the sense that the latter provides the means for the former to be 
internationalized.  
Although norms can exist without these organizational structures, these 
institutions create platforms where the states can exchange their ideas on certain 
matters and draft conventions to be ratified by the members. Nevertheless, 
international organizations are not important only because they introduced standard-
setting to international law, but also because they accelerate their diffusion, monitor 
their implementation and enforce the parties, until the full compliance with a norm is 
sustained. Human rights norms have become one of these tenets of international law 
after the Second World War where the tremendous achievement began only with the 
creation of these international institutions. This is paradoxical because human rights 
issues are in fact embedded in the national/local governments and traditions.
28
 
Nevertheless, human rights are in need of international organizations more than any 
other cooperation area such as trade agreements because the violations of these norms 
affect the everyday life of the citizens of delinquent states, not the interests of the 
parties to the human rights treaties, and the reactions to these violations cannot be left 
to arbitrary responses by the other governments or civil society organizations in other 
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states. Thus, the enforcement of human rights should be entrusted to the international 
organs which have some, if not full autonomy from the parties constituting them.  
The possession of this autonomy may be limited when states‟ „will‟ matter in 
decision making such as in the ratification of treaties, but once the norm is 
operationalized, the organization “takes on a life on its own”.29 If this give-and-take 
between states‟ sovereignty reflex and organizations‟ demand for greater autonomy 
favors gradual increase in powers of international organizations, this is encouraging 
for the future of diffusion of human rights not only because international level 
enforcement is critical for norm compliance compared to domestic drive for change 
and compared to the individual foreign policies of the states towards the delinquent 
state, but also because they can be specialized in those norms and monitor them more 
effectively than any other entity.  
This mutual interaction between states and the organizations has gradually 
transformed the idea of „unconditional sovereignty‟ to a „responsible sovereignty‟ 
understanding.
30
 Thus, sovereign status is contingent on the fulfillment of certain 
obligations not only to the international community, but to the individuals in those 
countries, who are now the subjects of international law.
31
 Therefore, today, if a state 
fails to commit these obligations; international organizations, the United Nations or 
the regional arrangements taking its source from UN-led International Bill of Rights – 
which will portrayed in detail in the next sections- have a word to say with their 
established human rights standards. Nevertheless, whilst both universal and regional 
organizations differ significantly from each other both in general and with respect to 
human rights, they have one trait in common: they have been less successful at 
securing enforcement than at setting standards in international law. Even so, regional 
organizations claimed to be better at norm promoting than global human rights 
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institutions have been so far. Since this thesis investigates this assumption and 
provides supporting case studies for the shortcomings of the United Nations in Darfur 
and for the relative success of the European Union in Turkey, it is significant to 
consider the debate between universalism and regionalism regarding human rights 
norms diffusion.   
 
b) Universal and Regional Human Rights Promotion: 
 
The effectiveness of an international human rights regime is measured with its 
ability to “enforce” respect for human rights in a sovereign state. The enforcement is 
more likely to take place when international cooperation is based on common interests 
across actors about a specific issue area
32
 and when these interests are so vital to be 
secured by an international authority which brings predictability, information and 
legitimacy to the system. This section will specifically serve the purpose of 
understanding the advantages that the EU has as a regional organization in comparison 
to a global organization. Although this section dwells upon the literature on favorable 
conditions that an organization is more likely to have when its area of focus regional 
rather than global, this does not mean that all regional organizations are always good, 
,or at least better than global institutions, at cooperation, thereby at diffusing norms as 
unitary and powerful actors. Europe has a unique success story in regional cooperation 
today, however, its use of the advantages resulting from its small area of focus deserve 
attention to acknowledge the UN‟s constraints and the fitness of political 
conditionality as an effective enforcement mechanism. 
The standardization of human rights norms have been one of these interests of 
the international community after two devastating World Wars. While the matter of 
human rights started to be perceived as “universal”, there had been a tendency to view 
regionalism in human rights matters as “the expression of a breakaway movement, 
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calling the universality of human rights into question.”33 The oppositions did not 
target regional mechanisms for the enforcement of UN-sponsored norms, but 
disapproved the regionalization of the standard-setting of human rights as there could 
be a contradiction between the African or the Asian norms and the American or 
European ones. Nevertheless, the continual postponements of the UN Human Rights 
Covenants in 1960s highlighted the importance of complementary regional 
organizations working in accordance with the UN human rights standards. This 
change in the perception of regional human rights system was due to the gradual 
increase in the perceived advantages of the regions compared to the world wide 
solutions to human rights violations.  
The advantages of regional organization regarding human rights promotion are 
manifold.  First, regions tend to have more “geographic, historical, cultural bonds” 
among the states constituting them which in turn results in “similar national 
problems”, similar level of awareness about the common interests.34 Second, the 
practice shows that any recommendation by a regional organization confronts less 
resistance than those of a global body. Third, these limited segments of the globe 
propose wider and effective publicity about human rights. Fourth, the regions do not 
refrain from „general, compromise formulae‟ reflecting innumerous political 
considerations. Moreover, “manageable proportions” of the adaptation of international 
solutions to real problems and commitment by the states to these solutions increase 
the likelihood of enhancing human rights system within the region.
35
 Consequently, 
the regions offer the UN effective intermediary instruments for human rights 
promotion. In other words, global human rights promote “the minimum normative 
standards” reflecting lowest common denominator in bargaining frontier, but regional 
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human rights instruments “might go further, add further rights, refine some rights,” 
and consider the peculiarities of the region. 
36
 
When we apply these propositions favoring regional organizations in human 
rights promotion to Europe, we see that they are already proven in the EU case. Both 
the UN and the EU had its origins in the desire to eliminate the causes of war and to 
eradicate the calamities of the first half of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the EU 
added a policy of integration in the region which is the chief source of its success. 
This success has been possible for various reasons favoring regionalism in Europe.  
First, the EU‟s motive has been to reconstruct Europe with Franco-German 
reconciliation via economic integration which has aimed to end a rehearsing historic 
crisis. Since the motive was a matter of life or death for the EU, the integration has 
been uniquely successful. The initial design of the EC reflecting similar national 
problems in the region along with common interests for the future have always been 
consistent with human rights norms. However, the EU‟s emphasis on human rights 
has become more visible in the Post-Cold era with the desire to reconstruct its role in 
global politics as a civilian/normative power. The need for promoting human rights 
norms along with democratic principles has been essential in order to bring 
predictability to this newly emerging system with full of uncertainties. Besides, 
although the EU still does not have a bill of rights functioning as a hard law yet -
despite its willingness which failed with the rejection of the European Constitution-, 
“European human rights policies became intertwined with the emerging institutions of 
the European Community”37 and with the human rights instruments of the Council of 
Europe. 
As the theoretical chapters on norms and institutions suggested, the interests of 
the members within the organizations matter. However, the EU member states have 
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more common interests in human rights and democracy compared to the UN at global 
scale. Moreover, although the EU supported both regional and global level institution 
building, they preferred to “get their own house in order”38 rather than to mess with 
the distant parts of the worlds such as Africa due to the fact that the EU member states 
have more interest in a neighboring country which respects human rights and 
democracy than the other parts of the world because the security within its geography, 
and the economic, social and cultural relations within its region matter more for the 
Union and for any other regional organization. More importantly, if this borderline 
state is also a prospective EU member state, it has an interest in being a full member 
to benefit from the union both economically and geopolitically and thus, has a motive 
to respect human rights and apply democratic principles. This dual sided motivation 
for norm compliance eases the EU‟s norm diffusion process. 
Therefore, the EU as a regional organization which makes it easy to monitor and 
respond to any human rights issue immediately because of its small size and relative 
homogeneity compared to the UN, is able to get significant commitment from its 
members and prospective members for their adherence to human rights standards. 
This is essential for assessing the peculiarity of the EU due to the expediency of 
regionalism to human rights promotion. 
     
 c)  The Promotion of Human Rights Norms: United Nations as a Global 
Human Rights Promoter 
 
Human rights, far from being „timeless and unchanging‟ social practices, are 
created as a result of a certain way of thinking followed by a certain sequence of 
historical events that took place in a particular geography. In other words, the notion 
of human rights emerged with the rise and consolidation of liberalism in the West.
39
 
Despite the historical particularity and contingency of the rise of the notion of human 
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rights, these rights can still be claimed as universal; not only because they are „the 
inalienable rights one has because one is human‟, thereby held „universally‟ and 
„equally‟ by all human beings; but also they are almost universally accepted as ideal 
norms, at least rhetorically.
40
  
Fukuyama argues that human rights norms still proved to be a „broadly 
appealing‟ ideal despite imperfect practices.41 This argument seems plausible given 
the prevalent ratification of the International Bill of Human Rights, including the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),  the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR), and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and two optional protocols. Nonetheless, 
compliance with international human rights accounts for “the actual behavior beyond 
mere rhetorical commitment”42  
Kent suggests a five-point continuum to achieve full meaning of compliance to 
human rights norms: the ratification of human rights treaties and acceptance of the 
right of the human rights institution to monitor and respond to the conditions of the 
state (1), the procedural compliance by the fulfillment of reporting and other requests 
by supervisory bodies (2), substantive compliance with the requests of human rights 
body (3), de jure compliance, or the implementation of norms in domestic legislation 
(4), and de facto compliance, or the rule consistent behavior on domestic level (5) 
43
 
In practice, despite the approval of existence of human rights norms and the 
ratification of the Bill of Rights by a considerable number of states; the widespread 
lack of fulfillment of this „continuum of compliance‟ in the globe is partly because the 
human rights initiatives by the UN did not bring about strong enforcement 
mechanisms concerning human rights to the international system.  
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One of these enforcement mechanisms that UN lacks is the application of “hard 
law” beyond stated legal principles in the Covenants.44 Hard law brings higher levels 
of protection to the individuals vis-à-vis their state because it ensures that any 
violation of legal principles will be treated individually in a court and these court 
decisions will be binding as well which will remove the loopholes of the general legal 
framework. Thus, the hard law created in the courts will clarify the obscurity of legal 
principles with innumerous amount of specific judgments about individual cases. This 
is by no means to say that the sole way to have an effective enforcement mechanism is 
through creating hard law, but it is still an important one as the states will be 
disinclined to violate the rights if they know that every individual in the society may 
take legal action against the state in an international platform.   
Since the UN did not establish a human rights court where legal principles stated 
in the UN Covenants could be binding on the parties, the human rights can be diffused 
primarily through policy actions of the parties, and these actions may even have a 
greater impact than court decisions on human rights compliance if effectively used.
45
 
These effective mechanisms include measures such as selective trade barriers, general 
embargoes or boycotts including financial transactions like bank loans, reduction or 
cancel of military support or financial aid etc.
46
 Although these primarily economic 
sanctions aim to deter human rights violations committed by the state, they may also 
deepen these violations by leaving the society in misery, thus such measures should 
“target regimes rather than people.”47 Moreover, the instruments for norm diffusion 
that the UN has are primarily the tools of negative enforcement which punishes and 
sanctions the violator state. In other words, the UN lacks positive enforcement 
instruments and rewards that the EU has. The UN has nothing concrete to offer to the 
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states complying with human rights norms except international prestige and except 
what can be called as non-punishment. On the contrary, the EU has various carrots for 
the compliers and sticks for the violators which will be discussed in the next chapter.  
Besides, the potential success of policy actions are not realized because the 
parties to the treaty regime are reluctant to involve in actions against many kinds of 
human rights issues of the violator state such as “police brutality, press censorship, 
freedom of expression etc”.48 Although the violator breaches the erga omnes49 vis-à-
vis all other states
50
, the likelihood of using aforementioned measures is very small. 
Given the fact that even the serious and systemic violations such as genocide, mass 
killing, and ethnic cleansing did not lead to strong and rapid reactions by the 
respondents in all cases and the evolving norm of humanitarian intervention to protect 
civilians threatened by their own state has been selectively applied, it is difficult to 
foresee the deterring impact of legal rules in the UN framework on human rights 
violations such as the violation of freedom of expression. Moreover, realizing  
humanitarian intervention to stop the violator state is difficult not always due to the 
unwillingness of the members as a result of cost-benefit analysis of an intervention in 
the region, but also due to its requirement for huge financial and human resources 
demanded by the members; while enforcement of freedom of expression does not 
require such huge resources. However, it is still vital as it is the right to life under 
threat and the UN is struggling with the unwillingness of its member states to 
operationalize their resources due its lack of enforcement mechanism and its lack 
autonomy. 
On the other hand, although the violation of freedom of expression does not 
require such rapid reaction as the right to life does, the EU is still helping Turkey to 
achieve stability willingly because it is in the member state’s interest and because it 
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can do so which contrasts to its position at UN in Darfur case, meaning that the UN is 
not capable of stopping violations in Darfur due to the lack of financial and human 
sources and the UN member states are willing to take efficient policy action or supply 
enough resources for humanitarian purposes in Darfur.  In other words, even freedom 
of expression is strictly on the agenda of the EU when it comes to prospective member 
states although it could have been overlooked easily by the international community 
because it reflects deeply rooted national political culture when there is no strict 
agency scrutinizing the state at close range such as the EU.  
In a nutshell, not only the lack of tools of the UN as an autonomous entity, i.e. 
the lack of hard law and human rights courts; but also the lack of will of the parties to 
the UN Covenants for policy actions against the delinquent states constituted 
stumbling blocks on an efficient UN human rights system. However, one should not 
underestimate the actions of non-governmental organizations such Amnesty 
International, the action of corporations and even the actions of private individuals 
because there are numerous cases that they contributed to the human rights 
compliance – although it is difficult to pinpoint their pure impact- more than the state 
foreign policy actions and more than the separate human rights institutions. However, 
neither global intergovernmental initiatives nor non-governmental organizations have 
been as successful as the European region has been in norm diffusion. Thus, it is 
crucial to see the evolution of the concern for human rights norms as well as the 
institution-building in Europe. 
 
d) Regional Organizations and Human Rights Norms: Council of Europe 
and the European Union 
 
The difficulty of a functioning of global human rights system is mostly due the 
variety of political cultures and changing degrees of political willingness preventing to 
converge policies at international level.
51
 The issue-specific human rights regimes 
such as International Labor Organization (ILO), issue-specific regional organizations 
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such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and regional application of human rights such 
as Council of Europe (CE) have proven to be more successful than the UN Bill of 
Rights at global scale because of the aforementioned favoring conditions of 
regionalism. Besides, the EU among them as the most successful example of regional 
cooperation has been able to incorporate the human rights standards to its structure 
deriving from both global and regional sources. On the top of that, the EU‟s political 
conditionality has been the most effective tool for democratization and respect for 
human rights given the attractive reward of full membership. Since this thesis focuses 
on the role of institutions on norm diffusion also in Turkey‟s policies, I will first 
introduce the CE, which is mainly responsible for the upholding democratic systems 
in Europe and which is the main basis for the EU human rights policy. Later, I will 
present the EU as a separate entity that scrutinizes specific human rights practices not 
only in member states or in prospective members but also in third countries at the UN 
level for a better application of the position of the EU in Darfur case. Only then, I will 
be able to locate the right to life along with sovereignty as responsibility and the right 
to freedom of expression as human rights norms deriving from these global and 
regional organizations.  
The CE is an international organization established in 1949 and composed of 47 
European member states and “concerns itself with all matters except defense” such as 
human rights, democracy, rule of law and the harmonization in legal standards, 
creating awareness about Europe‟s cultural identity and diversity.52 The most 
groundbreaking initiative made by the CE has been the European Convention for the 
Protection Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter the Convention) in 
1950. Since then, the ratification of the Convention and commitment to the principles 
in this Convention has been the compulsory membership qualification for the CE.
53
 
Although the rights stated in this document is akin to those of Universal Declaration 
and the two Covenants, its effectiveness comes with the creation of an international 
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judicial body under the Convention in 1959 that is able to enforce its decisions: 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
54
 This court allowed the removal of the 
loopholes of the legal drafting, in other words, refined the rights and responded to 
every possible situation which is not stated in legal documents and brought the notion 
of “evolutive interpretation”55 to the system, which transforms the legal principles in 
light with the changing conditions of the time and specifying the rules applied to 
individual cases. Moreover, European Commission of Human Rights, which is created 
in 1954,  reviews the private petitions coming from “persons, groups of individuals, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other states asserting violation of the 
Convention”56 and either dismisses the application or report its opinion to the state 
which is not legally binding. Although this is the case, the member states usually 
accept these reports. If not, the Commission can bring the case to the court for a 
binding decision. If this enforcement mechanism does not work on the state, the 
ultimate sanction for non-compliance is expulsion from the Council of Europe.
57
  
The deterring impact of the ECtHR is not comparable to any kind of human 
rights institution given the fact that over 800 million citizens living under the 
jurisdiction of CE member states do have a platform to take an action against any 
violation their fundamental rights individually. All these enforcement techniques 
brought by the CE have “raised the bar for human rights standards” and increased the 
pressure on “the states that lag behind European norms”.58 The strength of the regime 
is evidently due to voluntary national commitment to the authoritative decisions by the 
Court, which is precisely lacked in the UN as the previous section depicted.  
The appealing nature of the Convention is noticeable in various occasions. First, 
the number of states adhering to private petitions and the supremacy of the Court‟s 
decision has increased even when it was optional in CE‟s history until 1998. For 
example, Turkey accepted these restrictions on competences in 1987. Moreover, 
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members have gone beyond simple ratification of the Convention, but also 
incorporated the treaty to their national law. Besides, Central and Eastern European 
states sought membership in the CE after the end of the Cold War before they apply to 
the EU. In other words, it worked as a testimonial presented to the EU. No country has 
been an EU member so far without CE membership. Thus, “such adherence” to the 
CE “was a sign of being European, as well as a stepping stone to possible membership 
in the EU.”59 Lastly, the transformation of optional acceptance of the jurisdiction of 
the Court and the allowance of private petitions to a compulsory one in 1998 pointed 
out the success of the Convention and the willingness of the member states to go 
further in enhancing human rights.  
The vitality of the Convention and the ECtHR for the EU is not only because 
their authoritative rule over domestic law ensured stability in Europe, but also because 
the EU needed these instruments due to the absence of its own bill of rights though 
„respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms‟ has been perceived as a 
prerequisite for the applicants to the EU.  
At the Union level, the European Union in its initial design were “more 
concerned with the freedom of market place rather than the rights of the individuals” 
simply due to the fact that human rights were seen to be “appropriately protected at 
the national level.”60 European Court of Justice (ECJ), the judicial organ of the EU, 
primarily focused on the supremacy of EC law over national law regarding economic 
practices; however, the judges who are generally specialists in economic law showed 
a great flexibility regarding human rights issues despite the absence of bill of rights in 
the EU.
61
 Thus, this transformation reflected in the Maastricht Treaty (TEU)
62
. Article 
6 of the TEU explicitly provided that: 
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1. The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles 
which are common to the Member States. 
2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles 
of Community law.
63
 
 
Later, with the Amsterdam Treaty, a procedure allowing suspension of 
membership in case of “a serious and persistent breach of human rights” introduced.64 
The EU in 2000 prepared its own „Charter of Fundamental Rights‟ and incorporated it 
to the draft EU constitution which has been rejected in 2005. However, this document 
is still cited by the ECJ due to the agreement at ministerial level during its preparation 
phase. Thus, it has a kind of soft law status within the EU.
65
 
While these initiatives at the union level has become successful, the EU also 
promotes human rights at international level by using certain restrictive measures such 
as “diplomatic sanctions (expulsion of diplomats, severing of diplomatic ties, 
suspension of official visits), suspension of cooperation with a third country, boycotts 
of sport and cultural events, trade sanctions, arms embargoes, financial sanctions, 
flight bans and restrictions on admissions etc.”66 Beyond these restrictions targeting 
compliance, the EU accounts for the adherence of third countries to the human rights 
instruments such as the ECHR, the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the other conventions 
and charters ratified under the UN, the CE etc.  
Moreover, the catastrophic ethnic cleansing that took place in Bosnia and later 
in Kosovo made the EU concerned about its regional security and defense measures 
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for humanitarian purposes because these events showed that such massive violations 
can happen even in their relatively peaceful continent. Along with this concern, the 
desire to reconstruct the EU‟s role in the Post-Cold War system as a civilian and 
normative power guarding respect for human rights and democratic principles brought 
about the need to donate financial sources to global human rights institutions. Even so, 
this transformation of the EU has had several constraints including the difficulty to act 
as a union, problem of legitimacy in the eyes of citizenry about the transference of 
domestic financial and human resources to distant places for humanitarian purposes 
which will be illustrated in Darfur case in detail. It is important to clarify here for 
supporting of the argument of this thesis that the success of the EU as a regional 
organization in diffusing human rights norms to candidate countries through its 
membership offer does not require the success or efficiency of the EU at the UN level 
as an agent of norm diffusion. This does not necessarily lead us to a conclusion that 
the EU is ineffective in promoting human rights at global level. Actually, the lack of 
enforcement ability is pertinent to the UN, not to the EU at UN level. In other words, 
this thesis does not argue that the EU is more successful at both regional and global 
level and the UN is not, but rather argues that the EU has a reward for norm diffusion 
at regional level that is what the UN lacks at global level.  
The peculiarity of the membership offer of the EU led to the creation of the most 
successful human rights promotion instrument which is the political conditionality on 
the candidate countries. The introduction of accession criteria in the June 1993 
Copenhagen Council, also known as Copenhagen criteria requested the fulfillment of 
“the achievement stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”67 to open negotiations 
along with economic criteria and the requirement of the adoption of the law of the EU, 
the acquis communataire. This requirement since its operationalization has been a 
significant impediment to the granting EU candidacy to the Central and Eastern 
European countries, Western Balkans and Turkey as well as a great incentive for them 
to enhance their human rights records. Therefore, it is important to assess the impact 
of political conditionality on norm diffusion to portray the EU as an actor of political 
change. Such a criteria is also absent for the UN, as any state could become a member. 
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e) Positive Political Conditionality as the exceptionality of EU as a 
Human Rights Promoter 
 
The EU membership as a magnet for the applicant countries has been attached to 
a strict political conditionality during the accession process and brought “considerable 
transformative power” not only regarding domestic human rights records, but also in 
terms of “economic recovery, peace and stability, and democratization.”68  
 
When we consider Europe as a region, we see that the nation-states have 
generally assigned norm promotion in Europe to their regional institutions rather than 
relying on international institutions or individual foreign policies.
69
 It is then 
important to point out this atypical nature of the European experience at regional level 
in order to acknowledge the lack of similar instruments of the UN at global level. 
 
Schimmelfennig defines political conditionality as “a strategy of reinforcement 
used by international organizations and other international actors to bring about and 
stabilize political change at the state level.”70 These strategies can take different forms 
such as “social influence and persuasion”, but the peculiar success of the accession 
conditionality strategy is owing to its promise on benefits such as “financial 
assistance, some kind of contractual association, or -ultimately- membership”,71 which 
is defined as positive conditionality. The negative conditionality, the main instrument 
in the UN, is not applied through big sticks in the EU case such as extra punishment 
                                                          
68
 Schimmelfennig, Frank; Scholtz, Hanno; “EU Democracy Promotion in the 
European Neighborhood:Political Conditionality, Economic Development, and 
Transnational Exchange”, National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR): 
Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century: Working Paper No. 9, 2007, p. 3 
69
 Ibid.p.14 
70
 Schimmelfennig Frank, “European Regional Organizations, Political Conditionality, 
and Democratic Transformation in Eastern Europe” paper prepared for Club de 
Madrid - IV General Assembly, Prague, 10-12 November 2005, p.2, can be found at 
http://www.eup.ethz.ch/research/promoting/fs-prag.pdf  
71
 Schimmelfennig, Frank; Scholtz, Hanno, “EU Democracy Promotion in the 
European Neighborhood:Political Conditionality, Economic Development, and 
Transnational Exchange”, 2007, p. 5 
32 
 
for non-compliance. The EU rather prefers to menace the potential beneficiaries with 
withholding carrots such as denial for external assistance, association agreement, 
partnership or membership. Such rewards-based policies are favorable to norm 
diffusion compared to sanctions when we consider that the coercive policies by the 
EU on Bosnia and Kosovo have been useful “to stop violent ethnic cleansing but have 
not accelerated either democratic consolidation or Western integration.”72 Thus, this 
thesis, whilst linking the success of the EU as an agent of human rights norm diffusion 
to the presence of its political conditionality, specifically means the reward-based or 
positive conditionality; in particular the accession criteria for membership to the EU. 
 
The effectiveness of conditionality depends on three factors: “the size of 
international rewards, the size of domestic adoption costs, and the credibility of 
political conditionality.”73 The political conditionality leads norm compliance in the 
EU case; when  the reward is as big as membership to the Union; if this reward is 
desired by the target state even after a cost-benefit analysis meaning that the benefits 
of the reward exceeds the cost of the relative loss of autonomy of the state to the 
individuals, and groups of individuals such as minority groups, interests groups etc. in 
the name liberal democratic principles and respect for human rights; and when the 
rhetoric of the EU matches reality, in other words, when the EU‟s commitment to 
deliver the reward in case of compliance and suspension of the reward in case of non-
compliance is ensured. Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the role of 
“favorable domestic political conditions”74 increasing the effectiveness of the EU‟s 
political conditionality, but this does not mean that domestic conductivity is enough 
for norm compliance without international demand.  
 
Although the EU also targeted human rights promotion outside its region, the 
lack of membership offer in return for the compliance with its political conditionalities 
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hindered the EU‟s effectiveness at global level. Not only the small size of rewards 
which can be applicable to outside Europe such as financial assistance, trade 
concessions etc. but also the excessive costs of compliance for the delinquent states 
caused ineffectiveness of the EU in the distant parts of the world because the targeted 
countries at global level are usually authoritarian regimes -not struggling democracies 
at regional level. This means that the loss of autonomy of the government over 
individuals via human rights principles is more costly than those who are in the phase 
of democratic consolidation. Regarding the credibility criterion for naming an 
organization effective, the EU at global level used its political conditionality 
“inconsistently and rather unsuccessfully”, thus it is not as credible as at global level 
as it is at regional level.
75
  
 
 
 
f) The issue of Sovereignty in Human Rights Context 
 
Human rights debates largely revolve around the concept of sovereignty. 
Therefore, it is inescapable to define sovereignty and its evolution which gives 
legitimacy to the enforcement of human rights norms over the world. “The doctrine of 
state sovereignty implies a double claim of autonomy in foreign affairs” such as 
political independence and territorial integrity; and “exclusive competence in internal 
affairs” 76 including the right to defend and govern the nation. The second part of this 
definition requires absolute domestic jurisdiction of the state over 
making/implementing laws in its territory. Thus, the concern for independence over 
domestic jurisdiction, especially when the state behaves as the master of its citizens 
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rather than a servant to them
77
, impedes human rights compliance process most of the 
time.  
Hedley Bull counts sovereignty as the constitutive norm of the present 
international system, which inherently influences the behaviors of actors.
78
 This norm 
as the backbone of international system is legalized by the UN Charter in the 
aftermath of the Second World War with a statement of non-interference in the Article 
2(7): „Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State‟. The 
tension between “the principle of state sovereignty” of the founding pillar of the 
United Nations (UN) system and “the evolving international norms related to human 
rights” in international law is not likely to be vanished easily.79 The changing nature 
of sovereignty from being a matter of authority to that of responsibility, and the 
limitations on exclusivity and absoluteness of state sovereignty by sharing jurisdiction 
with international organizations over their relations with the individual citizens is 
perceived mostly as an infringement of the norm of non-intervention.  
Furthermore, sovereignty reflex is important especially in the resistance phase 
when the topic comes to international attention. In other words, sovereignty becomes 
important claim for the violator state when it is tried to be taken away. Sovereignty, 
then, stands as a way to escape from the potential sanctions of the international 
community by claiming the legitimacy of domestic actions, but do not constitute an 
explanation for violation. 
Although the notion of sovereignty is no longer remained intact in an increasingly 
multilateral world, both the states breaching human rights might still use this notion as 
armor to possible counter-measures by the international actors and the potential 
respondents to these violations might still hesitate to interfere with the domestic 
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human rights violations elsewhere; especially when the transgressed rights are applied 
to small groups in scale and when they are ignorable in substance such as freedom of 
assembly, freedom of expression etc. Even when there are massive breaches to basic 
physical security rights of the citizens, the UN suffers from the lack of capacity “in 
terms of finance, personnel, and political commitment”80, despite it has the necessary 
legal standards to legitimately intervene in the violator state‟s sovereignty. Thus, there 
is a tradeoff between sovereignty in the classical sense and the impact of international 
organizations on human rights  
 
 
g) The Right to Life, Responsibility to Protect and Humanitarian 
Intervention as Human Rights Norms 
 
The issue of humanitarian intervention has stimulated one of the most intense 
discussions of international relations both theoretically and practically in the Post-
Cold War era. Humanitarian intervention is defined as “coercive interference in the 
internal affairs of a state, involving the use of armed force, with the purposes of 
addressing massive human rights violations or preventing widespread human 
suffering.”81 The debate over this newly emerging instrument has largely revolved 
around the sovereignty concerns due to the changes in the international system “where 
conflicts arise predominantly at a sub-state level.”82 Moreover, this phenomenon 
found a new ground for itself with “an expanded definition of what constitutes a 
'threat to international peace and security' under chapter VII of the UN Charter”83 by 
tying human rights to international responsibility which was previously left to 
domestic jurisdiction of states.  
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Although there are inherent ethical dilemmas regarding the right to life; such as 
death penalty as a result of legitimate court judgment, self-defense from unlawful 
violence, and deaths at times of lawful war with an exception of murdering prisoners 
of war and civilians;
84
 it still stands as the most sacrosanct right among other human 
rights due to its being a precondition for the exercise of other rights. The Article 3 of 
UNDHR upholds the right to life, liberty and security of the person. Similarly, the 
Convention on the Prevention of Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted in 
1948 prohibits “the killing of members of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group 
with the intent to destroy the group in whole or in part.” The Article 6 of the ICCPR, 
which is adopted in 1966, protects this right by saying that 
6(1). Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be 
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 
6(3). When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is 
understood that nothing in this Article shall authorize any State Party to the 
present Covenant to derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under 
the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide. 
 
By the same token, African Union (AU- Formerly Organization of African 
Unity- OAU) protects the right to life through the Article 4 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples‟ Rights  which was adopted in 1981. 
Nonetheless, the foundation of humanitarian norms at the international level 
does not automatically lead to strong international responses from individual actors in 
case of their violation. While gross violations to basic physical security of individuals 
in Northern Iraq or in East Timor had been responded by external military 
interventions that were justified on largely humanitarian grounds thanks to the 
permissiveness of the legal structure of the UN; similar mass suffering in Somalia, 
Rwanda, and Bosnia, although there was a strong case for such an intervention, were 
the ones where there were either no action or any action taken was “too little and too 
late”.  
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The UN has also been self-critical during and after these events, but blamed the 
Council for their unwillingness and ineffective offers to international community for 
humanitarian purposes and urged especially the Security Council (UNSC) members- 
who are given primary responsibility for sustaining peace and security in the world- to 
act against those violations wherever they might take place because the UN Charter 
required the Council to be the defender of common interest. Nevertheless, the initial 
design of the UN which gives veto powers to five permanent members, France, the 
UK, the US, China, and Russia make difficult to have authorization to the UN itself or 
to the regional organizations for any deterring action on the violator state. Due to such 
dependence on its members, the UN as an international organization lacks both 
credibility and consistency on human rights promotion. Even so, it has been unique in 
its success to create a legal platform where human rights norms are legitimized. 
Moreover, it has also been influential actor in spotting the malfunctioning sides of the 
system along with bringing about new proposals to eliminate them.  
The lack of legal basis of an intervention in the Post-Cold War era, and 
ineffective interventions with  ambiguous legitimacies in Somalia, Srebrenica, 
Rwanda etc. pushed the international community to call for a “Never Again” principle 
which has been constructed first by the independent International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) with a Canadian initiative in December 
2001 and later approved by the UN Security Council via a resolution on the Protection 
of Civilians in Armed Conflict in April 2006 under the heading of “sovereignty as 
responsibility”- or with a popular name in the literature as a norm of  “Responsibility 
to Protect” (Responsibility to Protect).85 This was a necessary transformation needed 
because the right to intervene into the state sovereignty has been discussed more than 
the ways to prevent mass killing. Thus, this principle while acknowledging the 
primacy of state sovereignty, this primacy has been made reliant on the fulfillment of 
the state‟s responsibilities.  
                                                          
85 The website of International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) www.iciss.ca/menu-en.asp  
38 
 
The importance of Responsibility to Protect is twofold:
86
 first, states themselves 
have the Responsibility to Protect its population from violations of human rights; and 
second, international community through the UN has the Responsibility to Protect 
populations from genocide, crimes against humanity if the state fails to do so. In other 
words, the norm of non-intervention principle has been added a parameter of an 
exception which is binding both at state level and at international level as 2005 World 
Summit Outcomes adopted the General Assembly Resolution 60/1 24 October 2005, 
Articles 138 and 139:  
“Each individual State has the Responsibility to Protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This 
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their 
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means” 
“The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful 
means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity.” 
This newly emerging norm has been doubted not only in terms of its being a 
challenge to state sovereignty and also for other reasons such as the selectivity of 
humanitarian intervention. If states exercise humanitarian intervention selectively, 
what could be the explanations for this arbitrariness where constructivism has failed to 
answer the non-intervention by major respondents in some cases although it would be 
appropriate both legally and ethically to rescue millions of sufferers in Darfur? 
Humanitarian intervention is not purely humanitarian from the realist paradigm, 
which I will follow throughout the paper, since it accounts for logic of expected 
consequences of an action for the state itself rather than its appropriateness. Thus, they 
criticize the norm of humanitarian intervention from a consequentialist approach 
which will be useful for explaining the motivations behind major respondent‟s 
attitudes/inaction towards the crisis in Darfur.  
First, I will apply Bull‟s criticism of humanitarian intervention as an explanation 
for the African Union (AU)-led intervention rather than the other 
regional/international organizations contributed by major players in the system. Bull 
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claims that humanitarian intervention poses a threat to international order- which is 
more important for the well-beings of individual states in a system- given that states 
have conflicting claims of justice.
87
 Similarly as Brown put it, to permit humanitarian 
intervention is “to accept that it is always going to be based on the cultural 
predilections of those with the power to carry it out”88 This will provide the reasons 
for the rejection of hostility towards “Western” led intervention due to gross power 
asymmetry and for the search of African solutions to African problems.   
Second, the realist critique of humanitarian intervention and the most important 
for the claim of this paper is that unless vital interests are at stake, states will not 
intervene if this risk their soldiers‟ lives and brings huge economic costs. 
Humanitarian considerations can play only a subsidiary role only if national interests 
are endangered. In that sense, an effective humanitarian intervention which 
immediately stops human suffering in far places, changes the calculations of the 
internal government by heavy sanctions is only possible by pursuing national interest 
which coincidentally serves for human rights. Its applicability to the responses by the 
US and the EU gives important insights for the reasons of the non-
interference/ineffective action/rhetorical level sanctions etc. Since I will also question 
the independence of the UN from their creators and members, it is also important to 
see its institutional capability with such constraints on its member states about the 
humanitarian intervention. 
Third, it is not only the self-interest that occasionally constraints states to act on 
humanitarian grounds, but also the normative concerns which can be tied back to 
material interests.  States “have no business risking their soldiers‟ lives or those of 
their non-military personnel to save strangers.”89 Then, humanitarian intervention also 
puts the legitimacy of the state action to risk its own citizens‟ lives since the citizens 
of a country should be morally concerned only with their own state. Thus, the 
possibility of lacking legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry can be also the hesitation 
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of the major respondents if one remembers the critiques towards the US failure in 
Somalia – perceived as the death of US soldiers “to prevent Somalis killing from one 
another.”90 
In a nutshell, in order to analyze the failure of the international community to 
respond Sudanese government effectively from a rationalist approach, this thesis will 
tie inefficiency of humanitarian intervention to three assumptions. First, its being a 
threat to order and instruments of major powers will draw upon Sudanese/African 
hesitation over intervention. Second, non/lack of-operationalization of military and 
economic capabilities will be due to lack of national interest over the region both on 
the US, the EU side, which automatically affect the UN‟s range of action. Third, 
though there is an emerging norm of Responsibility to Protect, which is tried to be 
legitimized at international level, there is still a lack of legitimacy at state/societal 
level of risking population resources of a country for the sake of humanity. 
These debates are important to understand the constraints that the UN faces and 
to point out the difficulty to act as autonomous entity at global level in such norm 
applications. Furthermore, the nature and the urgency of humanitarian intervention 
require negative conditionality which does not directly target norm diffusion, rather an 
immediate stop to norm violation. However, the UN lacks positive conditionality in 
other human rights issues as well such as freedom of expression. It is obvious that the 
UN lacks an offer of membership since it is a universal organization where the 
qualification of membership is not tied to any criteria other than holding the 
characteristics of statehood. Nevertheless, the other types of positive political 
conditionalities that the UN can make use of are not effective either because of its lack 
of ability to change the cost-benefit calculations of individual states, whether violator 
or responder, which are also mentioned in the previous chapters. 
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h)Freedom of Expression as a Human Rights Norm 
 
Although the right to freedom of expression in international law has been 
secured in legal documents by other clauses of human rights norms, direct references 
to freedom of expression in both in international bill of rights and in regional and 
documents should be drawn in order to see the differences among them in terms of the 
elaborateness of the content. Article 19 of the UNDHR; adopted and proclaimed by 
the UN General  Assembly, 10 December 1948; prefers to define freedom of 
expression without determining the cases where it can be restricted. 
91
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers.  
 
Article 19 of the ICCPR, which is adopted in 1966, on the other hand, has a 
more specific clause on freedom of expression compared to that of UDHR. While the 
means through which freedom of expression can be exercised are clarified, the 
restrictions are allowed under some ambiguous headings.  
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.  
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right 
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in 
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.  
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this 
Article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may 
therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such 
as are provided by law and are necessary:  
a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;  
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b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre 
public), or of public health or morals.
92
 
 
Nevertheless, the Article 10 of the ECHR is clear both about the means and the 
cases of restrictions due to the overall success of CE in going further in legal and 
practical terms in human rights norms. 
 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from 
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information 
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 93 
 
The right to freedom of expression, as the Article 10 (1) of ECHR and the 
Article 19 of UNDHR ensure, is a fundamental right allowing individuals to 
communicate alternative opinions without government censorship. Article 19 of the 
ICCPR, on the other hand, draws a distinction between freedom of opinion and 
freedom of expression, while the former is an absolute right, the latter can be 
restricted under certain circumstances. Freedom of expression can be exercised by 
every individual and every juridical persons such as media organizations through any 
medium of expression; verbally, visually, in a written format or in any forms of art. 
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However, there will always be cases where restrictions can be justified as necessary 
by using the Article 10(2) and the other related Articles in international and regional 
treaties; since “all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
interrelated.”94 Thus, the right-holders should acknowledge that the freedom of 
expression is not the only recognized value and the value of each right depends on the 
presence of others.
95
  
Nonetheless, there are limitations on those limitations regarding freedom of 
expression, which are clearly defined by the Article 10(2) of ECHR where a very 
high-level justification required for the interference. In other words, Article 10 of the 
Convention and the case law of the Court consider at least five criteria in order to 
justify an interference of a state to the right to freedom of expression. First, the 
restrictions should be „prescribed‟ by domestic or international law, which is 
accessible to the right holders. Second, these restrictions should be limited to those 
mentioned in Article 10(2) such as national security, territorial integrity, or public 
safety. Third, these restrictions should be “necessary in a democratic society”. In other 
words, if there is a pressing social need to restrict this freedom, this need should also 
be violating the principles of „pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness‟ of the 
democratic society. In doing so, the balance between „the interests of the society over 
those of individuals‟ and „the fair treatment of minorities‟ should be taken into 
account. The fourth criterion, which is the proportionality to have a lawful restriction, 
is not mentioned on the Covenant, but a part of case law of the Court. The Court is 
carefully observant on the proportionality of the restriction to the action of the right-
holder. Here, even if the restriction is justified with the previous criteria, 
disproportionality will still hinder lawfulness of the State‟s initiative. Lastly, the non-
discrimination principle applies to the right to freedom of expression as well as it does 
so to any right in the Convention. In a nutshell, unless the necessity and the 
proportionality of the restriction is justified on the ground that the right holder violates 
                                                          
94 Article 5 of the 1993 Vienna Declaration stated in Donnelly, Jack; “Universal 
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specific interests of democratic society prescribed by law, the right to freedom of 
expression cannot be ceased by the state.  
Nevertheless, in democratic societies, state does not take an active role only in 
lawful restrictions on freedoms, but also in the creation and the protection of 
substantial engagement of the citizens with those rights. For instance, in those 
countries, the state has the responsibility to exercise positive protection of its citizens‟ 
right to freedom of expression from third parties and from itself. In other words, the 
full achievement of freedom of expression is possible when the right-holder knows 
that the state and the law will protect its freedom and when the need for self-
censorship is minimal. Thus, full compliance with the norm of freedom of expression 
cannot be measured only with the number of persons whose rights are attacked by the 
state, but discerning the level of self-censorship in the society is equally important. 
Furthermore, the level of compliance to the right to freedom of expression can be 
determined by observing the state‟s respect not only to the „information‟ and „ideas‟,  
“that are favorably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference”, 
but also to “those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the 
population.”96  
It is significant to have every aforementioned components of freedom of 
expression in democratic societies. Turkey, on the other hand, generally disregards 
these criteria individually and collectively to be able to restrict freedom of expression. 
The only criterion Turkey used has been to look at the “content” of expression 
regardless of its nature and target.
97
 Nevertheless, this seems to be changing in Turkey 
thanks to its relations with the EU. 
The increasing rate and the level of compliance to the norm of freedom of 
expression in today‟s world and especially in Europe have various reasons; the precise 
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Treaty and Current Issues”, in Arat, Zehra Kabasakal; “Human Rights in Turkey”, 
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legal documents at global but most importantly regional level; their increasing 
legitimacy in the eyes of many countries; the inclusion of human rights to the foreign 
policies of the role-model liberal democracies. However, none of them is sufficient to 
account for the high level compliance in Europe alone because neither legal base, nor 
the endorsement of legitimacy of the norm or the inclusion of human rights in foreign 
relations is unique to Europe, but exist at global level as well. The impact of EU level 
human rights policies is influential in an unexpected way for a model of international 
cooperation. This lies in its small size of focus, its cooperation with successful 
regional organizations such as CE, OSCE; its emphasis on positive conditionality 
thanks to variety of offers such as association, partnership etc.; and many other sui 
generis features that it has, but the most important variable has been its membership 
offer to the countries in its region changing the calculations of the violator state in 
favor compliance and its willingness to deliver this reward in case of compliance 
because it is the common interest of all members in the EU, and also for the EU as an 
autonomous organization. 
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Chapter II: 
United Nations and Darfur Case: Humanitarian Intervention 
and Massive Violation of Basic Physical Security Rights 
 
This chapter aims to have a clear discussion about the role of the UN on norm 
diffusion. In doing so, Darfur case will be illustrated as a massive violation of basic 
physical security rights allowing the norm of humanitarian intervention and 
Responsibility to Protect. Throughout the chapter, while mentioning the historical 
background and the magnitude of the Darfur conflict, the priority will be given to the 
international response where recurrent condemnations have largely failed to translate 
into concrete political action to protect vulnerable civilians.
98
 Thus, the attitudes of 
major respondents to the conflict are crucial compared to the rest of the international 
actors due to their ability to change the nature and the scope of the conflict and their 
liability to become potential interveners due to their incentives/resources/capacity to 
act. The reasons of the ineffectiveness in changing the calculations of the Sudanese 
government over its own territory will be approached from the rationalist camp with 
its “logic of expected consequences” in norm compliance.  
According to Spokespersons for the UN, the present situation in Darfur 
represents “the world‟s worst humanitarian crisis”.99 This statement remains valid 
from 2003 onwards where the violence against civilians in Darfur has continuously 
escalated. The conflict in the Darfur region of western Sudan is mainly between the 
Janjaweed, a militia group recruited from local Arab tribes, and the non-Arab peoples 
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of the region
100
. Although the Sudanese government denies publicly that it supports 
the Janjaweed, it is an arm-provider to this militia group. Being a participant in the 
joint attacks to Darfuris, the Sudanese government‟s active involvement has later 
become apparent with the efforts of non-governmental organizations.
101
 
This chapter prefers to focus on the positions of three actors on the violation of 
norms of Sudanese government: the United Nations (UN), the United States (US) and 
the European Union (EU). First, United Nations, which has the priority in the creation 
of the general norm setting agenda, will be portrayed as an actor that experiences the 
dilemmas in its transformation from being an institution that prefers non-use of force 
to an institution that is for the use of force. Together with its decision-making 
mechanism in the Security Council on such crucial matters, its autonomy from the 
individual states in terms of capacity to act will be questioned. Second, the US 
response to the conflict will illustrate the imbalance between the existing capabilities 
of the US to handle the conflict and the degree of the realization of its ability. Lastly, I 
will mention the EU as an actor that tries to substitute lofty humanitarian rhetoric or 
condemnations with resolute action when it comes to global level due to the lack of 
appeal of this intervention to its interests, and argue that the unity among the EU 
members regarding regional issues is higher compared to international level while 
keeping in mind that this regional applies   
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I. Historical Background: 
The Genesis, the Peak point and the Magnitude of Sudan/Darfur 
conflict 
 
Sudanese conflict is the product of a number of ethnic, religious, economic and 
political tensions which date back to ancient history. As a former Condominium of 
Great Britain and Egypt from 1899 through Independence in 1956, Sudan has always 
experienced distrust between Northerners and Southerners which had also been 
provoked by the isolationist and discriminatory policies of Britain over the Southern 
part in favor of the Northerners for the sake of stability in Egypt, Sudan and thereby in 
the Suez Canal.
102
 At the time of independence, Sudan was to be unified, but 
immediately after the removal of British administrators in Southern region, Northern 
Arabs left English speaking Southern elites without political power. Tension will only 
then move to a different stage: an armed resistance movement. 
103
 
The conflict between Sudan and Darfur is not only a historical/external 
construction of an imperial power, but also a result of differences between their 
ethnicities reflecting upon their economic and political positions. While Arab 
Northerners holds the central political authority in its hands, being represented in the 
capital, Khartoum, have an access to the countrywide resources; the African 
population – around 40% of the total Sudanese population- is intentionally 
marginalized in their remote and impoverished region, and mostly tried to be 
Arabized.
104
 The allocation of resources by the Sudanese government on the Arab 
population gathered along the Nile up north has added economic and social inequality 
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to already existing political inequality- poor health services, poor infrastructure, 
breakdown in education, poor economic development, etc- and this led to continuous 
escalation of the tension between the Arabs and Africans since 1980s.
105
  
Even though the overall situation worsened from 1990's to 2002, the peak point 
of the conflict culminated in February 2003 with Sudan Liberation Movement/Army 
(SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) accusing the government of 
neglecting Darfur.
106
 This initially successful rebellion against the central government 
was responded by the Sudanese Government‟s arming Arab militias known as 
“Janjaweed” -devils on horseback. These Janjaweed militias empowered and 
supported by the Sudanese Government exercised violence, committed murders, raped 
and tortured countless civilians. Together with the Sudanese army's aerial 
bombardment of the Darfur region, “entire villages have wiped out, food and water 
supplies have been destroyed” with a refugee‟s words.”107 
The statistics of the conflict make the severity of the situation obvious. From 
2003 onwards; approximately 300,000 people have been killed and the mass 
displacement of an estimated 4.2 million people including more than 2.4 million 
internally displaced persons -who are dependent on humanitarian aid due to severe 
food shortages- took place.
108
 Thus, the conflict has not only affected the stability of 
Sudanese territory, but caused border problems with its neighboring countries, 
especially with the Chad government. 
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II. The Situation in Darfur and International Responses: 
International Awareness, International Initiatives and Actors’ 
Responses 
 
Although Khartoum has the primary Responsibility to Protect its own citizens 
against atrocities, it has deliberately ignored this responsibility. It is also clear that the 
government of Sudan has consistently failed to fulfill its obligations under 
international law; including those imposed by various Security Council resolutions 
and human rights treaty bodies and violated numerous international norms since the 
starting point of the conflict in 2003. Nonetheless, international awareness of the crisis 
was very slow to create an adequate attention that year. It was mostly because of 
sustained and systematic obstruction by the government of Sudan, which prevented 
both working/lobbying humanitarian organizations, notably Amnesty International, 
Médecins Sans Frontiers and physically prevented the world media109 from entering 
Darfur by Khartoum‟s news blackout. 110 The immediate response in the form of 
persistent mediation efforts first came naturally from Chad as the side-effects of the 
Sudanese internal conflict had already brought aforementioned consequences across 
border. Increasing number of displaced people, refugees in Chad and in Central 
African Republic, combined with the collection of data about the scope of the conflict 
–such as US government satellite photography- made systematic atrocities visible to 
the international community from 2004 onwards despite Khartoum‟s hindrance of the 
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51 
 
situation.  Then, in March, Chad as official mediator hosted N’djamena talks with the 
group of international facilitators such as the US, the EU (represented by France), the 
African Union (AU), and the UN. These talks resulted in a humanitarian ceasefire 
agreement between the Sudanese government and the two rebel movements with the 
support of the African Union.
111
 This led to the establishment of an AU peacekeeping 
mission, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which was at first mandated to 
provide military observers to monitor and report on the ceasefire; an armed force to 
protect civilians and humanitarian aid workers; and an unarmed civilian police force 
and support teams were added later.
112
 This force neither has the means, expertise and 
resources for a complex and modern intervention nor has “the peace” to keep in the 
region where the mission was supposedly deployed with a veiled „Chapter VI‟ 
peacekeeping mandate.  
Choosing African Union as a first resort has different explanations. Western-led 
humanitarian intervention perceived both as a threat to order and as an instrument of 
major players for achieving their goals over and across the region. First, Arab League, 
and most of its member states, “is xenophobically opposed to a Western-led 
intervention in North Africa, and strongly protective of one of its own.”113 Given the 
fact that AU operates with the consent of Khartoum, its actions are extremely bound 
with the reactions from the Sudanese government. So-called desire of “African 
solutions for African problems”114 failed despite desperate attempts on the part of the 
African Union. Moreover, African Union also had to try so hard because of the delay 
and inaction from the major respondents‟ of the issue. From the Western perspective, 
it can be seen as the hesitation to be present in a region where both the norm violator 
government feels hatred due to the violation of non-interference from external actors 
and where the other countries in the continent is tired of any kind of domination of 
Western powers historically.  
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a) The Role of the United Nations 
 
During the AU intervention, the UN‟s role predominantly has been the 
endorsement of the intervention through a number of Security Council Resolutions 
and actions. These attempts include slow and ineffective actions such as  a push for 
“increasing diplomatic pressure”115, “encouragement of international community to 
support the AU”116, “acceptance to refer war crime suspects in Darfur to the 
International Criminal Court”117 as an instrument to identify individuals obstructing 
the peace. Moreover, seemingly effective actions by the UN suffered from the lack of 
monitoring of its implementation such as “the extension of responsibility of Sudanese 
government to „neutralize armed militia‟ to „disarmament of militia‟. A solution to 
avoid the hostility towards a complete AMIS handover to the UN mission, the UN has 
taken “the initial attempt towards an UNMIS hybrid deployment to Darfur”118 
On May 5, 2006, the Sudanese government and one rebel (SLM/A) faction 
signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in Abuja, Nigeria. Nonetheless, other rebel 
groups, namely JEM and a rival faction of SLM, perceived the DPA inadequate to 
meet the needs of Darfurian sufferers and did not sign the treaty which then had been 
responded offensively by the Sudanese government. The violence in Darfur has in fact 
worsened in the year since the DPA was signed.
119
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UNSC Resolution 1706 adopted in 2006, which invited Sudan‟s consent to a UN 
force, was rejected by Khartoum and the new-way out was the proposal of a hybrid 
force of UN-AU peacekeeping (UNAMID) which was duly mandated on July 31, 
2007 also with the consent of Khartoum government.
120
 This force had the mandate to 
take necessary action to support the implementation of the DPA, as well as to protect 
its personnel and civilians, without “prejudice to the responsibility of the Government 
of Sudan”.121 Then, the UNSC unanimously voted to send 20,000 troops, 6,000 police 
and 5,000 civilian personnel to Darfur to supplement the existing AMIS (African 
Union) mission in January 2008. “But only about 9,000 soldiers and police officers of 
the authorized 26,000 have deployed.”122 Thus, they are desperately short of personnel 
as well as essential equipment related to logistics, helicopters etc., which would make 
access to remote parts of the region far easier. Reports show us the increasing 
complexity of the conflict compared to what it was in 2003 due to the multiplicity of 
rebellious groups.  
It was not the lack of current operational capacity causing the deadlock of the 
conflict so far. No earlier UN effort had contributed to the deterrence in Khartoum‟s 
actions either because of the inability to decide upon the matters on time – 
debating/dithering over Darfur-or because the implementation of legalized decisions. 
123
 
Leaving the reasons of the creation of International Organizations (IO) aside – 
on which there exists a huge amount of literature, the United Nations gives a clue how 
the IOs function after its creation. Is it a creature of its member states? Although there 
is an expanded definition of what constitutes threat to “international peace and 
security” which legalize and authorizes the international force to stop the conflict 
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under the UN Charter and the resolutions passed by UNSC has allowed international 
community, more than ever, to do something for human rights violations; that did not 
automatically lead Security Council to show willingness for such an intervention. 
China, given the fact that it is the largest importer of oil from Sudan, has been ready to 
block/veto any over effective UN measures from the beginning of the conflict which 
explains much of UN inabilities. Moreover both Russia and China are doubtful about 
any UN intervention on a humanitarian basis, “fearing it may lead one day to 
intervention in Chechnya or Tibet or Xinjiang.”124 This shows that UN has so many 
constraints upon itself rather than functioning as a constraint on state behavior in an 
anarchical order where there are interest seeking members. Even before considering 
the agreement over intervention, UN‟s lack of constraining function on the states is 
already apparent in the actions of Khartoum. UN officials‟ acknowledgment of the 
magnitude of the issue rhetorically did not matter for Khartoum as to reconsider its 
calculations since the response was already two years late since the beginning of the 
conflict. This is too late for dissuasion of a norm violator. 
 More importantly, beyond the institutional/political burdens on the way to a 
multilateral solution, it was also the result of ineffective unilateral positions to 
Sudanese government. As Ms. Jody Williams, head of the UN high-level mission to 
Darfur, spoke about the basis of the problem in March, 2007: “There are so many 
hollow threats towards Khartoum, that if I were Khartoum I wouldn‟t pay any 
attention either.”125 Therefore, it is also important to mention the responses of 
individual actors such as the US. 
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b)The Position of the US  
 
Traditional international reluctance to use the word “genocide” has been a 
persistent feature of the Darfur crisis as it was in Rwanda. Nonetheless, this time US 
Secretary of State Colin Powell, in 2004, announced that “genocide has been 
committed in Darfur… and may still be occurring.”126 This decision was responded by 
UNSC members and advocacy organizations that “naming the situation in Darfur 
genocide would commit the US to action, specifically intervention”. US State 
Department then launched an investigation team which later approved the situation as 
being an act of genocide which then pronounced by President George W. Bush in the 
US Congress which was the first time in the US history that a conflict has been 
labeled as such while it was still going on.
127
 However, this finding was announced 
“to have no impact upon US Policy” and the US passed the issue to UNSC. In this 
way, neither the US had closed the ways to emerging norm of Responsibility to 
Protect, and thereby humanitarian intervention, in case it can be necessary in 
occasions where the US interests are at stake nor had the responsibility to act in 
accordance with its rhetoric of genocide by submitting the issue to the UN knowing 
that ineffectiveness of the institution will not danger the material and populational 
resources of the country.  
A key factor which affected the process on Darfur on the part of the US was an 
international reluctance to see a strong military intervention in the wake of invasion of 
Iraq. Moreover, not only the international attitude might make the US hesitate, but 
also the suspicious attitude/hostility towards the presence of the US in the region, the 
fear of interest-seeking exercises of the US in case of a possible unilateral intervention 
would cause the possible peacekeeping force to dysfunction. 
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Concerning the handover of AMIS to the UN forces, US‟ attempt to convince 
both Sudan, and AU to the effectiveness of one organization‟s actions instead of two 
failed.
128
 UNAMID, which currently has the lead in the conflict, suffers both from this 
duality and lack of resources and manpower. 
While the US has been a major funding country for both AU peacekeeping and 
humanitarian aid efforts in Darfur, the actual costs related to Darfur have exceeded the 
calculations due to the changing nature and scope of the crisis. The discrepancy 
between funding and the need for frequent emergency measures cannot be effectively 
responded by the US because “within the President's proposed budget for Fiscal Year 
2008, there is a projected $186 million shortfall for Darfur peacekeeping, and a $6 
billion shortfall for America's core humanitarian assistance.”129 These numbers show 
the lack of real commitment of the US to solve this crisis which seems to affect 
millions of Darfuris. 
Action with a dedication to a real solution is what really matters. Without the 
possibility of solving the crisis entirely, acting may mean at best “crisis in slow 
motion”. Despite the so-called efforts of the US, the visible failures of the possible 
solutions both at the level of decision making and at practical level stimulate the 
question of how “humanitarian” is the intervention: as one former senior UN official 
commented that the international community is “keeping people alive with our 
humanitarian assistance until they are massacred” as this can be the case for Darfur.130 
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c) The Position of the European Union 
 
The EU, today -with its 27 member states, at the time of the start of the conflict 
with its 25 member states, and with a quarter of the world gross national product- 
neither lacks resources nor the man power, nor is it because such an intervention 
clashes with the EU‟s stated ideals such as humanitarianism and morally balanced 
foreign policy. Even though there has been no shortage of condemnation of 
Khartoum‟s action from Europe‟s leaders, 131 the rhetoric hasn‟t been matched by 
action. While Europe‟s leaders are genuinely concerned about what is going on in 
Darfur, they prefer to approach the conflict resolution in favor of “African solutions to 
African problems” from the beginning. This derived from their success to have 
regional solutions to their regional problems and lack of interests to operationalize 
financial and human resources in far places.  
Even after witnessing the inadequacy of AMIS, the EU did not go beyond 
continuous condemnations and has provided just around 100 police and military 
advisers to AMIS -out of AMIS‟ total 7000. It has also provided very generous 
financial support of 400 million euros provided by the Commission and member 
states.
132
 However, the failure of the AU did not push the EU to show the willingness 
to send the NATO forces to the region. Although, the former NATO Secretary 
General, now EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Javier Solana said that it was “NATO‟s objective…to halt the violence and bring an 
end to the humanitarian catastrophe” through “military action”, this principle does not 
apply to protect Africans in Darfur.  
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Moreover, the EU has not enacted any sanctions against the regime, nor 
discouraged European companies from doing business in the country.  The EU chose 
to hide behind a "requirement" that the UN should enact mandatory global sanctions 
first, but then did not show the willingness to realize this global sanction under the 
umbrella of the UN.
133
 Moreover, both the EU and the UN focused on the exercise of 
sanctions at the individual level –war criminals- instead of a state level sanction to the 
Sudanese government which would change the calculations of Khartoum. Even 
individual level is problematic due to selection of low-level individuals, none of 
whom are senior government policymakers. 
134
 
Despite the inefficient responses of the EU during the 4 years of conflict, on 28 
January 2008, the EU has decided to launch a bridging military operation in Eastern 
Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) in the 
framework of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).
135
 It was mostly 
because Chad‟s threat to expel refugees from Sudan's Darfur region, saying their 
presence is triggering insecurity, and called on the international community to take 
them away. The contribution to the force is imbalanced: more than half of the troops 
are deployed by France and other EU countries have so far been hesitant to commit 
their own military or specialized technical personnel. This shows the difficulty of 
united “action” compared to “speaking” with one voice.  
Both the US‟ and the EU‟s ineffectiveness can be approached from the UN‟s 
inability to change the actors‟ cost-benefit analysis in which operationalization of 
military and economic capabilities is too costly for a region where these actors lacks 
national interest. Besides, though there is an emerging norm of Responsibility to 
Protect which is tried to be legitimized at the international level, there is still a lack of 
legitimacy at state/societal level of risking populational resources of a country for the 
sake of people in distant places. Logic of appropriateness is thus difficult apply to this 
                                                          
133 Miller, Leland Rhett and Bock, Christian W.D., “Again, Never: The EU's Failure to 
Act in Darfur. Journal of European Affairs”, Vol. 2, No. 4, December 2004. Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=633483  
134 Human Rights Watch, World Report, 2008, 
http://www.hrw.org/englishwr2k8/docs/2008/01/31/sudan17759.htm  
135 European Union at United Nations website:  
http://www.europa-eu-un.org/Articles/en/Article_7689_en.htm  
59 
 
case because neither Sudanese government accept the behavior as a norm which is 
appropriate to comply with, nor the respondents are willing to give resources without 
any interest in the region‟s peace although they repeatedly acknowledge dreadfulness 
of the events.   
Nevertheless, the EU‟s approach to human rights violations in its region and its 
level of impact on norm compliance is completely different due to diversity of 
willingly rewarded political conditionalities and their appealing nature for the violator 
states. Let us see the reasons of the success of the EU as an agent of norm diffusion by 
looking at the Turkish case where the improvement of human rights records coincided 
with the increase in credibility of its membership prospect.  
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Chapter III: 
The European Union and Turkey: Freedom of Expression 
The theoretical chapter provided that the existence or imposition of international 
norms, and even their endorsement are not sufficient to dwell upon the conditions 
under which they would be complied with. Turkey is not an exception to that common 
view. The desire of Turkey to be a part of Western world coming from its Ottoman 
legacy has been an important driving force behind its rapprochement with the West 
and its membership to the Western organizations and institutions. However, the 
conflict between Turkey‟s authoritarian heritage and democratization process has been 
the source of the vicissitudes in the commitment to the human rights norms in its 
history.    
One of these human rights violations committed in Turkey has been notorious 
Article 301 in Turkish Penal Code. This article criminalizes the denigration of 
Turkishness, the Turkish Republic, and the foundation and institutions of the State. 
Not only the ethnic connotation of the article, but also its frequent use and arbitrary 
interpretations have been subject to extensive criticism by the international 
community, specifically by the European Union with the start of Turkish accession 
negotiations on October 3, 2005.  
Given the “strong promotional”, albeit “weak monitoring” procedures of the 
UN-led global human rights norms, the most important steps of Turkey on the way to 
respect for human rights have been through its relation with European-led 
organizations, and specifically with the EU. Several positive conditionalities have 
been applied by the EU such as external assistance, association agreement so on and 
so forth, but none of their success has become as visible as full membership offer. 
61 
 
Since this thesis compares the level of impact of international organizations on norm 
diffusion Therefore, it is important to see the efficiency of membership bid of the EU 
as a carrot for democratization and respect for human rights because the UN does not 
and will not have such a great reward for the violators and relative inadequacy of 
other conditionalities will hinder its deterring impact on the violator state. 
The Association Agreement (Ankara Agreement) between Turkey and the EC 
was signed in September, 1963 to show the commitment of both sides to “the step-by-
step establishment of a customs union.”136 Although associate membership status gave 
Turkey a hope for community membership in the future, Turkey had to wait for 
decades to get credible promises from the EU. Moreover, at that time, both sides of 
the agreement emphasized economic benefits of integration. Nevertheless, whilst the 
European integration had been transforming itself from being solely an economic 
union to a political one, Turkey‟s mindset could not be altered easily to keep up with 
this change in EU integration in the 80s and 90s in which the membership status 
started to be highly rest upon “the performance relating to the democratization and 
human rights.”  
Although Turkey took initiatives to adapt to those diversifying paths of 
integration, they did not really bring about substantial improvements to its democracy 
unless Turkey had the prospect of full membership. Thus, the European impact on 
Turkey has been tremendously important especially with Turkey‟s application to the 
EC for full membership 1987 onwards. The application has been responded with a 
prioritization of the finalization of association and achieving a customs union because 
Turkey, at that time, as an associate member had not yet fulfilled the requirements 
during transitory stages to a customs union which were foreseen by Association 
Agreement and specified by the 1970 Additional Protocol. This was first because 
Turkey‟s freezing the association in 1978 due to perceived economic burdens. Later, 
the EU also suspended it relations with Turkey in 1982 as a reaction to the 
undemocratic atmosphere caused by 1980 coup d‟état in Turkey. The EU also blocked 
the Fourth Financial Protocol which was about a financial aid package to Turkey. 
                                                          
136 Müftüler-Baç, Meltem;  “Turkey‟s Political Reforms and the Impact of the 
European Union”, South European Society and Politics Vol.10 No.1 April 2005, p.19 
62 
 
Given the absence of a significant popular demand domestically, negative 
conditionality in the form of withdrawal of external assistance and suspension of 
association might have caused a considerable pressure on the military to leave the 
authority for a civilian rule, but not enough to alter the calculations of the military 
immediately.  
Even when the reward is limited to association, the impact of the EU on Turkey 
has been significant. Positive conditionality imposed especially by the EU Parliament 
before its vote on Customs Union in December, 1995 made Turkey to pass a package 
of constitutional change
 137
 which also touched upon non-violent expression of 
political views in Anti-Terrorism Law. Nevertheless, these changes have been 
perceived by the EU as „cosmetic‟ because these superficial legal changes does not 
bring any substantial improvement to solve deeply rooted problems of Turkey and its 
democracy. Furthermore, the rejection of Turkey for EU candidacy in Luxembourg 
Summit of the European Council in 1997 had proved the importance of „reinforcement 
by reward‟ because without the membership incentive there was no a fundamental 
change on the way to democratization or a major improvement in human rights 
records. Later, the EU reconsidered the implicit promise of full membership in Ankara 
Treaty and the awkward situation of Customs Union with a country which cannot be 
even a candidate. Finally, Helsinki European Council held in December 1999, granted 
a candidate status to Turkey. This has been the first time in Turkey that but gained 
momentum with Turkey‟s EU candidacy since 1999. With the start of accession 
negotiations, Turkey began to consider major reforms to remove traditional stumbling 
blocks on its democracy. The right to freedom of expression has been one of these 
issues. 
Negotiations with the EU are opened on the basis that “Turkey sufficiently 
meets the political criteria” set by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, and 
later proclaimed by Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union and in the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights.
138
 As we have mentioned in the previous chapter, “the 
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stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities”139 are sine qua nons for EU membership. 
Nevertheless, respect for these principles is by no means irreversible, thus cannot be 
guaranteed just because they were once adopted in a given country. Thus, the EU 
needed to include a threat of “suspension of negotiations” in case of serious breaches 
of these principles which is asserted in the Negotiating Framework with Turkey in 
order to sustain compliance. This threat did not only mean a delay in the completion 
of negotiations but also meant a loss of reward if Turkey halts the reform process or 
reverses the progress achieved. The cost of the absence of the reward has a deterring 
impact on violation due to the benefits of the full membership.  
Although Turkey‟s relations with the EC/EU have been a strong motivation on 
the way to the adaptation with international norms, and with the political 
conditionalities in general, the aspiration for modernization has not been limited to the 
European integration. Turkey has been among the founding members of the United 
Nations in 1945 not to be marginalized by the international community due to its 
neutral stance in the Second World War.
140
 Turkey has been granted a founder 
member status to the Council of Europe in 1950. It has become a member of NATO in 
1952, a founding member of OSCE in 1961 and an associate member of EEC in 1963. 
It has signed ECHR in 1954 just a few years after its adoption by the CE.  
These memberships have given “some recognition to Turkey‟s European 
identity”141 which has always been “an implicit objective of Turkish foreign 
policy.”142 Since the European identity has not only been attached to geographical 
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considerations, Turkey‟s aspiration for Europeanization gradually revolved around 
democratic principles, norms, and rules through various organizations. 
On the whole, this chapter will thus linger over the European impact on 
Turkey‟s democracy and its human rights dynamics historically. In doing so, I will 
first illustrate the impeding domestic factors to Turkey‟s aspiration for 
Westernization. Only then, it will possible to refer to the Article 301 debate as a 
violation of the right to freedom of expression in the light of the concern of loss of 
autonomy of the state over individuals.  
 
I. Historical Legacies Leading to Human Rights Violations 
Although the international and regional organizations increasingly do matter in 
international relations, their impact on human rights is still dependent on the degree of 
permeability of the states. Hence, this section focuses on the domestic factors leading 
to human rights violations because it is important to see why these factors are 
compensated by the EU‟s reward of full membership. It will also allow us to see the 
magnitude of the EU‟s achievement on altering sacrosanct policies of Turkish 
Republic.  
Turkey has been reluctant to remove the pressure on the right to freedom of 
expression mostly because of two intermingling factors shaping the state‟s political 
atmosphere since the foundation of the Republic in 1929. First one is caused by the 
narrow definition of minority concept and the correlated problems with the definition 
of “Turkish” identity and the second one is related to the fear about territorial 
disintegration caused by a collective psychology in Turkey which is called Sevres 
syndrome.
143
 Dwelling upon these two factors will be useful to understand how much 
the EU has been successful as a catalyst for domestic change targeting these 
traditional and persistent factors leading violations of human rights.  
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The concept of minority is closely associated with the definition of 
“Turkishness” which is also the main component of Article 301. Thus, the meaning of 
Turkishness is essential to understand the basis of the punishment of “the denigration 
of Turkishness”. This definition has been problematic ever since the foundation of the 
Republic because Turkishness as a supra-identity of the state has been the same with 
“one” of the sub-identities in its territory, i.e. Turks. This was not historical heritage of 
Turkey‟s Ottoman past; quite the contrary the supra-identity of Ottoman Empire 
embraced and recognized all sub-identities, but did not coincide with any of them. 
Nevertheless, Turkey, by limiting minority status to “non-Muslims” in the Lausanne 
Peace Treaty signed in 1923 following Turkey‟s victory in the War of Independence, 
forced all other sub-identities except Jews, Greeks and Armenians to accept the supra-
identity of Turkishness as their identity which at the end “created an imbalance in 
favor of Turks.”144 For instance, Turkey refused to grant minority status to the Kurds, 
who are the second largest group in Turkey after Turks. This was due to a perceived 
threat for “the unity of nation” because giving those equal rights with the majority and 
further minority rights which are internationally recognized such as building their own 
schools, using their mother-tongue meant that the nation is not united anymore
145
 
Besides, even the non-Muslim minorities included in the Lausanne Treaty did not 
enjoy their rights fully, they have been perceived as foreign nationals rather than loyal 
citizens of the state. Thus, Turkish supra-identity with its ethnic connotation estranged 
both non-Muslim minorities and also other sub-identities. The Sèvres Treaty which 
was signed after the First World War, though replaced with the Lausanne Treaty of 
favorable conditions, left a fear for the new Republic which is called Sèvres 
syndrome: a fear of partitioning of the country as a result of “collaboration between its 
minorities and their foreign allies.” Any idea against traditional conceptualization of 
minority, the demands for redefinition of state identity has been oppressed from the 
beginning of the Republic and intensified with the military coups which have been 
stumbling blocks on the way to democratic consolidation in Turkey. The peak point of 
the impact of those fears in Turkish society has been its manifestation in 1982 Turkish 
Constitution restricting especially freedom of expression and criminalizing any 
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dissident opinion.
146
 Since then, important steps have been taken on the way to 
remove discriminatory, fear-related clauses and their undemocratic exercises in 
Turkish legal system. The EU has been the major catalyst for domestic change in 
Turkey especially with the increase in the credibility of Turkey‟s membership to the 
EU.  
Turkey has tried to justify this perception and the related violations of human 
rights based on “territorial integrity” principle of international law. While such 
principle is universal and inalienable in international system, Turkish Constitution has 
another clause accompanying this principle: “the integrity of nation”147 This phrase is 
unique when we compare it to the constitutions of liberal democracies because there is 
no such monolithic concept of the nation in those states which disregard the 
differences and causes assimilation of those differences by imposing a dominant 
ethnic supra-identity. Moreover, a well-known defense by Turkish political elites on 
the existence and the use of Article 301 claims that there are compatible articles on 
public denigration in European legal systems as well and it is necessary for public 
peace. Nevertheless, as Joost Lagendijk, the chair of the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee with Turkey, commented on this claim, in those countries, especially in 
Germany and Austria, there are clauses for criminalizing denigration of the state, but 
none of them includes an ethnic definition such as “Germanness” or “Austrianness”148 
Moreover, none of those liberal democracies ignore the supremacy of individual over 
the state/society unless the individual threaten them. Thus, in a world where 
individuals have been the subject of international law, it is more difficult sustain 
human rights violations by claiming the unity of the nation.
149
 Nevertheless, without a 
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strong enforcement mechanism, deeply rooted legacies of the state have been difficult 
to vanish.  
There are also theoretical explanations which are useful to discern the extent to 
which compliance with the right to freedom of expression has been persistent on 
specific issues, such as Kurdish and Armenian issues. First, there are political 
explanations; non-democratic regimes, and the states in transition to democracy 
compared to democratic regimes, the countries facing real or perceived threats such as 
civil or international war, separatist movements and terrorism compared to the ones 
that do not have such threats, are more likely to violate human rights.  For instance, 
the demands of Kurdish minority to have a greater autonomy in Turkish politics have 
long been responded in a repressive way. Interestingly, Turkish state seems to react 
similarly, both to terrorist activities committed by PKK and its offshoots, and also to 
the Kurdish political movements which stem from the same vein, the repressed status 
of the Kurdish minority in a period starting from as early as the foundation of the 
Turkish Republic. Demanding more autonomy that is political is equated with 
terrorism, and the state‟s threat perception led to human rights violations, thereby 
became an obstacle on the way to democratization.   
Secondly, economic explanations dwell upon the correlation between the 
countries with fewer resources/poor countries tend to repress its citizens more due to 
the distributional domestic conflicts. Turkey, again, stands as a relevant example for 
the economic aspects of human rights violations backing up by its political and 
ideological reasons for violations. The resistance to recognize Kurds as a separate 
minority brought an economic marginalization of the Kurdish people and serious 
problems of economic under-development of the eastern and south-eastern region 
where Kurds are mostly populated.
150
 This inequality is not specific to the region but 
to an ethnic minority because the Kurdish people in western Turkey also suffer from 
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social and political problems, lack of education, and massive unemployment.”151 This 
discrepancy between Turkey‟s east and west, adding to manifold aspects the Kurdish 
question, “seems to be a major challenge for Turkey in its process of 
democratization”152 and a major cause of repression.     
There are also other arguments based on economy relating to the impact of 
globalization, and specifically free trade on the condition of human rights in domestic 
environment. Nonetheless, the result of this correlation is ambiguous due to lack of 
research and the recency of the globalization process to see its end result on domestic 
human rights conditions. Thus, neither the ones who claims that expansion of free 
trade leads compliance to human rights nor the supporters of the view that free trade 
increases human rights violations had handful results regarding the impact on 
political, civil, economic rights of the citizens. However, we can still claim that in 
Turkish case, the timing of economic liberalization and especially increasing 
economic relations with the EC coincided with political liberalization, yet whether it 
is a correlation or causation needs further research. 
Thirdly; cultural/ideological explanations concentrating on the ideologies 
deeply embedded in inter-communal hatred or revenge for past abuses. Such 
ideologies justify all the means including repression and show them as vital 
necessities to achieve a greater end. This explanation is very much in line with the 
discussions of Armenian genocide. Turkey in order to prevent the recognition of 
Armenian genocide argued that Armenians who died in 1915 events are the victims of 
the warfare rather than a massacre. There are other arguments blaming the victims as 
the initiators of aggression thus suggesting that they got what they deserved. Some 
also claimed that murderers did not really murder; victims were not really killed, but 
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died due to “famine, war, and disease”.153 This debate is closely associated with the 
freedom of expression because any attempt by the intellectuals to elucidate the 
Armenian question has found repressive reactions as if they attacked the state‟s honor 
with words. 
After presenting primarily domestic explanations to human rights violation such 
as political regime, threat perception, economic well-being, state‟s ideology- except 
international war and globalization- on human rights conditions; it becomes apparent 
that human rights violations reflect deep aspects of a state‟s political structure as well 
as its historical legacy. The restrictions on freedom of expression in a state also reflect 
these roots of violation. Therefore, it is difficult to see for foreign states and 
international organizations without efficient monitoring mechanisms and effective 
political conditionalities aiming to remove these deeply embedded factors of 
violations. The EU having these instruments has been able to attack these factors. 
 
 
II. Historical and Empirical Analysis of Turkey’s Human 
Rights Record 
 
The political conditionality of the EU has attracted its neighboring countries 
with the size and credibility of its reward which changes the actors‟ calculation on 
compliance. Thus, the EU has been leading the Europeanization process in Turkey as 
well. After mentioning the historical background of Turkey-EU relations and the 
reasons for persistency in human rights violations, it is now necessary to see Turkey‟s 
human rights records regarding freedom of expression and to what extent the EU has 
been influential in changing the delinquent state‟s calculations.  
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In doing so, this thesis preferred to focus on the Article 301 of Turkish Penal 
Code as a valid illustration of domestic change among other human rights issues in 
Turkey in general and among other restrictions on expression of opinions because 
there has been a concrete policy action for a domestic change in 2008. Moreover, both 
the original Article 301 which replaced the Article 159 carrying heavier penal 
provisions and the amended version of the article entered into force as part of penal-
law reform demanded by the EU on the way and during Turkey‟s accession 
negotiations. Not only the negotiation phase but also the popularity of the violation 
due to the involvement of public in general, civil society organizations and media to 
the cases against Orhan Pamuk, Turkish Nobel Laureate in Literature; Hrant Dink, a 
Turkish-Armenian journalist who was murdered in 2007, and many other journalists 
and writers, or to the strong criticism made by the EU officials and by the individual 
member states. After a strong insistence on non-compliance, this legislative 
amendment to the Article 301 will allow us to see both resistance and compliance 
phases of norm diffusion and to evaluate the impact of membership incentive on the 
change in cost-benefit analysis of Turkish government. 
Consequently, this section will first problematize the article as a violation of the 
right to freedom of expression based on our theoretical discussion and Turkey‟s legal 
responsibilities to international law. Second, in order to see domestic dynamics 
attracting the EU‟s attention, a historical/empirical analysis of the Article 301 will be 
portrayed along with EU‟s pressure for domestic change.  
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III. Freedom of Expression and the Debate over Article 
301 in Turkey 
 
Freedom of Expression is an inalienable right for individuals, but international 
human rights regimes also account for legitimate limitation of its exercise to protect 
the fundamentals of a state such as national security, territorial integrity, or public 
safety. Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code is an article by which such a restriction is 
applied to freedom of expression. Nevertheless, as Turkey did not always fulfill the 
criteria of legitimate restriction prescribed by international law or disregarded at least 
one criterion mostly the necessity and the proportionality of the restriction, “much of 
the ECtHR‟s case load on the freedom of expression has come from Turkey.”154 
Turkey has been persistent to change this law although it has been sued frequently 
owing to the right to individual petition to ECtHR of Turkish citizens which was 
ratified by Turkish Parliament in 1987.  
Turkey as a part to various human rights treaties and institutions did not really 
consider changing the article before it felt the EU pressure. In June 2005; Turkish 
Grand National Assembly introduced Article 301 as a legislative reform prior to the 
start of accession negotiations and initially meant to remove the threat to the freedom 
of expression caused by Article 159 of the old penal code. Article 159 had already 
changed twice in 2002 and in 2003 through the third and the seventh Harmonization 
Packages with the EU. Preceding the negotiations with the EU, the hope for an 
abolition or amendment of Article 159 ended in nothing. The arbitrary interpretation 
of vague terms of this article remained intact in essence in Article 301 as well. In 
other words, replacing the previous article by adding a distinction between criticism 
and denigration, of which the former will not constitute a crime; did not eliminate the 
controversies of the Article and the reduction of the years of imprisonment did not 
alter the problem of proportionality. Although the changes to protect freedom of 
                                                          
154
 Smith, Thomas W.; “Leveraging Norms: The ECHR and Turkey‟s Human Rights 
Reforms” in “Human Rights in Turkey” edited by Arat, Zehra Kabasakal,  p.272 
72 
 
expression have been superficial; the existence of a change in legal wording, the 
discussion among the political elites and its entrance to public discourse, and the EU‟s 
pinpointing the article amendment as a must are pertinent to the demands by the EU.  
Before depicting the impact of the EU on the amendment of the article, it is 
essential to have a look at the exact wording of the original Article 301. The article 
states that155 
1. Public denigration of Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six 
months and three years. 
2. Public denigration of the Government of the Republic of Turkey, the 
judicial institutions of the State, the military or security structures shall be 
punishable by imprisonment of between six months and two years. 
3. In cases where denigration of Turkishness is committed by a Turkish 
citizen in another country the punishment shall be increased by one third. 
4. Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute a crime. 
 
We suggested in theoretical chapter that freedom of expression can be curbed if 
it attacks the interests of the society. It is problematic in practice whether this article in 
the range of those interests. Article 26 of Turkish constitution protects freedom of 
expression and dissemination of thought within the limits identified by the Article 
10(2) of ECHR.  
Article 26 of Turkish Constitution  
Freedom of Expression and Dissemination of Thought (As amended on 
October 17, 2001)
156
 
Everyone has the right to express and disseminate his thoughts and opinion 
by speech, in writing or in pictures or through other media, individually or 
collectively. This right includes the freedom to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference from official authorities. This 
provision shall not preclude subjecting transmission by radio, television, 
cinema, and similar means to a system of licensing. 
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The exercise of these freedoms may be restricted for the purposes of 
protecting national security, public order and public safety, the basic 
characteristics of the Republic and safeguarding the indivisible integrity of 
the State with its territory and nation, preventing crime, punishing offenders, 
withholding information duly classified as a state secret, protecting the 
reputation and rights and private and family life of others, or protecting 
professional secrets as prescribed by law, or ensuring the proper functioning 
of the judiciary. 
The formalities, conditions and procedures to be applied in exercising the 
right to expression and dissemination of thought shall be prescribed by law. 
 
Thus, as the article points out that there are certain benchmarks to call for these 
restrictions in domestic law which has already been harmonized with the ECHR. 
Article 301 with its vague terms such as “public denigration”, with its ethnic reference 
to “Turkishness” and more importantly, with its openness to interpretation allowing all 
individual prosecutors to open a case based on their personal interpretation and 
political view, did not meet the requirements for permissible and legitimate 
restrictions on freedom of expression because this article has not been just legal 
statement but a political one as well.  
Along with small differences in wording of the clause regarding the right to 
freedom of expression, Turkey is in fact perfectly compatible with the international 
treaties it signed because the constitution gives supremacy to international agreement 
over domestic law as the Article 90 of Turkish Constitution suggests: 
Article 90 of Turkish Constitution: 
Ratification of International Treaties (As amended on May, 22, 2004) 157 
International agreements duly put into effect bear the force of law. No appeal 
to the Constitutional Court shall be made with regard to these agreements, on 
the grounds that they are unconstitutional. In the case of a conflict between 
international agreements in the area of fundamental rights and freedoms duly 
put into effect and the domestic laws due to differences in provisions on the 
same matter, the provisions of international agreements shall prevail. 
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Nevertheless, as the previous chapter dwelling upon the domestic factors for 
violation of this right suggested that since Turkish political system occasionally 
prioritized “national interest” with its own definition regardless of the right of 
individuals. Therefore, this article allows the prevailing political definition of 
“interest” to violate a fundamental human right to hold opinion and express it freely 
through any means of communication. Most notably, the subject of litigation has 
revolved around the same issues all over. “The dominant cleavage in the society 
between nationalism and the recognition of other ethnic groups in Turkey, in 
particular the Kurds”158 and “Armenian issue” have been an obstruction for Turkey to 
become a state that welcomes any non-violent expression. Nevertheless, in the recent 
years, the impact of the EU increased the costs for stifling policies on freedom of 
expression and also increased the benefits of compliance with the start of accession 
negotiations. Although there are still undemocratic practices both in the Article 301 
and other related articles of freedom of expression, there is also an attempt on Turkish 
side to deal with buried issues regarding both Kurdish question and Armenian issue. 
Let us apply the criteria for permissible restrictions to Article 301 case so that 
we can then claim that the practice of Article 301 has been a human rights violation 
and the amendment to the article has lessened the side effects of this article on 
individuals. 
These restrictions should be made known to the citizens and prescribed by law; 
must be perceived necessary for a democratic society.  Even if a restriction is 
necessary, the punishment should be proportionate. Although Turkey includes these 
limitations in its domestic law in line with those of ECHR, the interpretation of the 
clauses such as national interest, public order etc differs significantly. Thus, 
ambiguous terms of the article may or may not threaten the rights of individuals who 
expressed a dissenting opinion peacefully depending on the will and interpretation of 
the prosecutors. Moreover, Turkey has long understood the necessity principle in line 
with the continuation of its omnipotent power over the individuals and state ideology 
function. Nevertheless, this restriction should consider whether the expression fall into 
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the range of „pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness‟ of the democratic society, not 
into the range of state ideology. If the expression is not tolerable, the state has the 
right to decide to take punitive action. This action includes imprisonment in Turkey 
contrary to liberal democratic states that have comparable articles even though 
imprisonments are commuted to a fine. Besides, according to ECHR legislation, the 
balance between individuals, minority groups and society should be taken into 
account. In other words, neither the individuals/minority groups can threaten public 
peace nor society/majority can push the individual/minority groups to use self-
censorship or punish for their non-violent expression. However, the article both 
threaten the rights of individuals who talk about Turkey‟s untouchable issues with fear 
of imprisonment and multiplies the scale of violation of free expression because of 
self-censorship. Furthermore, the state by accusing the person for “insulting 
Turkishness” threaten the physical security and affect psychology of the person in 
his/her social life because identity issues are sensitive especially for ultranationalists 
and anybody in the society can take this so-called insult as if it is directed to 
themselves. Moreover, the non-discrimination principle applies to the right to freedom 
of expression. Nevertheless, many people tried under this article have been with 
Kurdish identity. If a law frequently accuses certain groups in the society, the 
neutrality of the state to the groups in its territory should be questioned. 
Consequently, Turkey prefers to focus on the “content” of the expression –
mostly if it is about the creation of minorities other than non-Muslims or articulation 
of Kurds as a minority and 1915 events. Among these principles only the necessity of 
the restriction may require content review, but the others are also essential for 
democratic society. Content review alone is problematic because opinions “those that 
offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population” are protected under 
the right to freedom of expression. 
159
 Moreover, the reiteration of issues reflects 
persistent state policies. The prosecutors have given legitimate authority to open cases 
on the basis of this vague article and they have especially targeted silencing 
publishers, editors, writers, journalists, intellectuals. The scope of violation is 
                                                          
159 The decision of the ECHR on Handyside v. United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, 1 
EHRR 737, Para. 49. İn Commonwealth Secretariat, “Freedom of Expression, 
Assembly and Association Best Practice”, 2002, p.16  
http://publications.thecommonwealth.org/, 
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enormous given 1481 cases, 2724 individuals, 14 of them children tried under Article 
301 “which have been brought to the courts in the three years since its inception in 
2005.”160  
High-profile cases have been important for the EU to monitor human rights in 
Turkey. There have been several declarations by the EU officials during these cases 
and they are included in the Progress Reports. Orhan Pamuk has been charged under 
Article 301 because of his comments during an interview with a Swiss newspaper 
(Tages Anzeiger) on 5 February 2005. He stated that, "30,000 Kurds and a million 
Armenians were murdered. Hardly anyone dares mention it, so I do. And that's why 
I'm hated". The charges against him dropped but he has been continuously threatened 
by extreme nationalists. Although the existence of the article has been criticized, 
acquittals have been perceived by Brussels as “a litmus test of Turkey's EU 
membership credentials.”161  
In 2006, Elif Şafak, a young novelist, also faced trial because of a statement of a 
character in her novel called The Bastard of Istanbul regarding Armenian genocide. 
Although this high-profile case also dropped, this has been an illustration of the 
limitlessness of violation of freedom of expression in the sense that even a statement 
of fictitious character in the novel can be a matter of accusation as Şafak noted: “the 
way [ultranationalists] are trying to penetrate the domain of art and literature is quite 
new, and quite disturbing.”162 
Another writer on trial charged under Article 301 in October 2005, was Hrant 
Dink, a journalist and the editor of the Armenian-language weekly newspaper Agos, 
he received a six month sentence, but it is suspended till he gave an interview to 
Reuters about the trial which led another trial demanded 3 years imprisonment for 
                                                          
160 http://www.internationalpen.org.uk/go/news/turkey-publisher-sentenced-under-
article-301 
161 “Court drops Turkish writer's case” 23 January 2006 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4637886.stm 
162 Susanne Fowler, “Turkey, a Touchy Critic, Plans to Put a Novel on 
Trial”Published: September 15, 2006 available at New York Times 
http://www.nytimes.com  
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Hrant Dink.163  Dink, in fact, had called for Armenians “to step back from insisting 
that Turkey recognize the Armenian killings of the Ottoman era as "genocide" as this 
had become an "unhealthy fixation." He had said today's Turks should not be punished 
for the sins of their forefathers 90 years ago.”164 He had been a target and hate figure 
for extreme nationalists as Article 301 marked him out as a denigrator of Turkishness 
and after receiving death threats and demanding protection from the state which was 
not provided on time, he was assassinated on 19 January 2007. The public in Turkey 
as well as domestic and international civil society organizations protested the murder 
on the streets while criticizing the clause Article 301, its reference to “Turkishness”, 
the state‟s inability to protect freedom of expression as well as physical security of its 
citizen, and they chanted all over: “We are all Armenians, we are all Hrant Dinks”. 
Although high-profile cases already had made the violation of freedom of expression 
known to the public, the popularity of the article on international scene, the debate in 
media and academia as well as consciousness at societal level have increased after this 
tragic event. Abdullah Gul, Turkish foreign minister at the time of assassination, 
acknowledged that “"With its current state, there are certain problems with article 301. 
We see now that there are changes which must be made to this law."165 
The EU has been monitoring the cases related to Article 301 closely especially 
since the negotiations have started. Joost Lagendijk, the chair of the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee with Turkey, attended the cases against Orhan Pamuk by 
himself. He also prepared a report for the President of the European Parliament, 
Hansgert Pöttering, about the controversies inherent to the Article 301 and the 
assassination of Hrant Dink. EU Enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn has 
continuously demanded that Turkey should amend its laws on limiting non-violent 
expression, in particular Article 301 of its penal code, but he said that “after the 
murder of Hrant Dink, our expectation has increased.”166 The EU has also warned 
Turkey about the consequences of slowdown of the reform process due to a possible 
                                                          
163 See Amnesty International Website 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=ENGEUR440352005  
164 http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=164468  
165 http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=5835918 
166 http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/400470.asp  
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support among the EU member states of Nicholas Sarkozy‟s anti-Turkey ideas. The 
President of European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, said that “freedom of 
expression is an essential component of EU standards, if Turkey wants be a member.” 
167 The Commission‟s Progress Report in November 2006, which harshly criticized the 
arbitrariness of the article soften the AKP government‟s approach towards Article 
301. In November 2006, Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, consulted to 
the representatives of civil society organizations, trade unions how to change the 
Article 301. Nevertheless, the delay in amendment to the article 301 was criticized 
2007 Progress Report as well. EU with hundreds of declaration specifically targeting 
Article 301 put such a pressure which could not be ignored by the government.  
The Article 301 has been both a norm violation and also a legal breaching of 
domestic law as well as the international treaties incorporated into Turkish 
constitution. With a strong criticism by the EU officials and by the individual member 
states Turkish parliament amended the Article in 2008 by changing the expression of 
„Turkishness‟ to „Turkish Nation‟, by limiting the duration of imprisonment, and by 
requiring the permission of Minister of Justice to start an investigation which means 
that no authority other than the minister is eligible to interpret the appropriateness of 
the case. This has been an effective amendment because the number of the cases 
opened using this Article has been reduced since the amendment along with the 
number of persons who can interpret this Article. When we compare 1500 cases 
opened by only few nationalist prosecutors till 2008, and only 70 cases permitted and 
403 refusals by the Minister of Justice since the amendment, it is obvious that this 
amendment has been sufficient to call as norm compliance. 168 
When the membership prospect has been less credible, Turkey preferred to see 
human rights problems “as an excuse for the EU officials rather than a reason for 
keeping out of the EU.”  It is true that the inconsistent nature of the EU policies 
caused a lot of vicissitudes in Turkish human rights record prior to the accession 
negotiations. Nevertheless, when Turkey is obliged to bring its human rights policies 
                                                          
167 http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/442602.asp  
168 http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/475376.asp 
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to EU standards by following a roadmap for full membership, the EU is proved to be 
successful in changing the calculations of Turkish government on norm compliance.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The prominence of human rights norms in international relations is pertinent to 
the creation of international organizations preceding the end of Second World War. 
Since human rights issues are deeply embedded in national governments; neither 
international treaties alone nor the individual foreign policies could have an all-
encompassing impact on delinquent states. Institutionalization of these organizations 
provided standard-setting to international law and accelerated norm diffusion through 
their enforcement and monitoring mechanisms.  
Nevertheless, the level of impact of these institutions differed significantly. As a 
starting point to explain this discrepancy, this thesis preferred to apply logic of 
expected consequences rather than logic of appropriateness because the case studies 
illustrated that the deterrence of violations occur only when the respondents perceive 
involvement beneficial, and when complying with a norm meets the violator‟s 
interests. This can be either because of primarily an excessive cost concern or an 
appealing nature of abundant benefits of compliance, but not in the case studies of this 
thesis because of the willingness to follow the norm because of its appropriateness and 
legitimacy and violate it due to its illegitimate nature. 
This thesis focused on the role of the UN and the EU as influential agents of 
norm diffusion and human rights promotion. Although they are not comparable 
institutions at first glance due to different membership requirements and area of focus, 
this thesis preferred solely to depict their enforcement capacities on specific human 
rights norms. In doing so, the presence and absence of political conditionality on the 
delinquent states has been the center of attention, rather than specific substantive 
features of these enforcement mechanisms.   
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First, the basic physical security of individuals is evaluated in Darfur case. This 
preference is derived from the fact that the UN has achieved most substantial 
innovations in such security related norms such as fight against torture, gross human 
rights violations rather than less vital norms such as freedom of expression. Even so, 
the UN lacked enforcement capacity on the violator states and could not be successful 
to alter their cost-benefit calculations on norm compliance This is mostly because the 
UN is destined to use negative conditionality on violator states due to the problem of 
offering a reward at global level, which proved to have less deterring impact 
compared to positive conditionality. Although this lack of success on the UN side is 
due to the arbitrary responses of the respondent states in the UN on the violator states, 
this is also related to the UN‟s inability to change the major actors‟ calculations on 
taking action against the human rights violations.   
Second, the right to freedom of expression is portrayed as a less vital compared 
to genocide, but a more ignorable violation of human rights norms because it deeply 
reflects domestic structure. The EU‟s approach to human rights violations in its region 
and its level of impact on norm compliance is completely different from that of the 
UN due to diversity of willingly rewarded political conditionalities and their appealing 
nature for the violator states. Membership incentive still has been the most influential 
one among others. It is important to note that this thesis did not account for the extent 
to which the conductivity of domestic environment helped the EU‟s success in Turkey 
as an agent of norm diffusion, but rather focused on the ability of the EU to change the 
calculations of domestic governments in its immediate neighborhood. Moreover, this 
thesis has not treated the legal amendment in article as a major change. Still, the 
impact of the EU has been enormous regarding the increase in public debate.  
Since the EU has been successful in Turkish case and failed in Darfur do not 
lead us to think that the EU is not a global player. The nature of violations and thereby 
the ways of reactions differ significantly. While the EU has to operationalize its 
material resources, and even military resources in Darfur case; a declaration, or a 
threatening rhetoric about the withdrawal or suspension of membership is enough to 
take a position in Turkish case. Nevertheless, this thesis compensates this 
incompatibility with the EU‟s concerned approach to freedom of expression, which is 
ignorable in nature. Even so, as this thesis does not aim to provide a general rule about 
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the impact of these organizations on domestic change and norm diffusion, it also 
acknowledges the possibility of different conclusions drawn from different case 
studies about the very same organizations.  
In conclusion, the history of international organizations promoting human rights 
norms is relatively short. Thus, one cannot claim that the best way to norm diffusion 
for all organizations is positive conditionality, and preferably membership incentive. 
Every organization has its unique features. The EU has the ability to use this carrot for 
norm diffusion effectively in its immediate neighborhood. The lack of reward by the 
UN at global level might be compensated by an increase in its autonomy from its 
members.  
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